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FUEL POVERTY IN IRELAND: EXTENT,  
AFFECTED GROUPS AND POLICY ISSUES 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent coincidence of rapidly rising energy prices with a sharp macroeconomic slowdown 
has placed the policy spotlight on fuel poverty. Years of strong economic growth in Ireland 
led to a reduction in indicators showing material deprivation, but progress in reducing poverty 
was always vulnerable to a change in economic conditions: “as growth slows, expectations 
about minimum standards may catch up with average incomes” (Layte et al. 2000). However, 
the element of material deprivation associated with adequate home heating – fuel poverty – 
has specific characteristics that distinguish the appropriate policy response to it from poverty 
abatement measures generally. 
 
First, the incidence of fuel poverty is strongly affected by volatile input prices determined 
largely on international markets. This means that in addition to households that are currently 
fuel poor at any given time, a significant number of additional households may be vulnerable 
to becoming fuel poor as prices fluctuate. Second, expenditure on household fuels is partly 
determined by the efficiency of appliances and the presence of energy saving features in 
residences. Fuel poverty is thus a problem of capital, as well as current, expenditure. Previous 
research suggests that market failures prevent some beneficial investments in household 
energy efficiency from taking place. Finally, there are specific externalities associated with 
fuel poverty: research indicates that fuel poverty has negative impacts on human health and in 
particular the health of children, the old, the sick and infirm (Healy, 2000; IPH, 2007). 
Indeed, Walsh (2008) suggests that recent reductions in Irish mortality rates might be at least 
partly due to reductions in the incidence of poverty and improvements in housing conditions. 
 
In this paper, we explore a range of possible approaches to measuring fuel poverty, estimate 
the scale of the problem in Ireland using two measures, outline the policies applied in selected 
foreign jurisdictions and discuss current and possible future policies for Ireland. 
 
A useful definition of fuel poverty is given in Brophy et al (1999) as: 
“The inability to heat one’s home to an adequate (safe and comfortable) standard owing 
primarily to low income and poor (energy inefficient) housing standards.” 
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Fuel poverty is a live policy issue in at least two respects. The more obvious of the two 
problems is that low-income households face difficulties in affording the capital and current 
costs of heating homes in an efficient way. The main policy interventions applied in Ireland, 
the National Fuel Allowance and the Electricity/Gas Allowances, focus on the short-run 
symptoms of this problem. However, to reduce fuel poverty in the longer term, income 
support policies may not be sufficient: there appear to be market failures preventing 
appropriate investment in the efficiency of the housing stock and household heating 
appliances. If this is so, and particularly if carbon prices are not at a socially efficient level, 
intervention to boost efficiency-improving investment will also be required. 
 
In addition, the presence of fuel poverty has an effect on the design and implementation of 
other policies. In particular, vulnerability of some consumers is sometimes seen as a reason 
for stalling the introduction of carbon taxes as part of national climate change policy. Because 
they raise energy prices, carbon taxes can exacerbate the problems of fuel poverty, 
particularly in view of the fact that vulnerable households are likely to use carbon-intensive 
fuels. The major difference from ordinary price rises is that the revenues yielded by carbon 
taxes are available to finance measures to counteract these problems.  
 
We begin the paper with updated estimates of how many fuel poor there were in Ireland when 
the most recent surveys were conducted, using two popular methods of measuring the 
problem. We then analyse the household characteristics associated with one of these 
measures, with a view to identifying some of the sub-groups within the population that are 
particularly prone to fuel poverty and highlighting potential drivers that may require policy 
attention. Section 4 discusses existing policies used in Ireland for addressing fuel poverty and 
considers options for future policy in this area. In Section 5, we briefly survey some of the 
approaches taken to addressing these problems internationally, and Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
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2. The current extent of fuel poverty 
The measurement of fuel poverty can be attempted by several methods. There are three main 
methods or combinations of methods in use (DEFRA, 2006). These are the expenditure 
method or share of income spent on household fuels, subjective measures on the part of 
occupants, and thirdly, objective measurement of house condition and comfort levels in 
relation to needs. 
Using data that has recently become available, this note applies the first two measures. That 
is,  
1. an expenditure measure, in which households are classified as fuel poor if they spend 
more than a given percentage of their disposable income on energy in the home, and  
2. a subjective measure, in which the occupants’ own assessments of their conditions 
are used. 
2.1 Expenditure measure 
While the expenditure share is an arbitrary and, in many cases, unsatisfactory measure, it does 
give an indication of household resources tied up in obtaining home heating and transport. It 
also helps give an indication of potential vulnerability, especially in the event of energy price 
rises. Boardman (1991) advocates a 10% threshold based on net income excluding housing 
costs, and this threshold is used in the UK fuel poverty strategy. The number of Irish 
households that are classified as experiencing fuel poverty in 2005,1 using the 10% threshold, 
is given in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Fuel poverty rate (10% expenditure measure) for 2005 
Year Share of households Number of households 
2005 15.9% 228,522 
Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
 
Given that the most recent HBS data are three years old, we have also produced a rough 
approximation of the fuel poverty rate in 2008 by extrapolating from the 2005 figures. This is 
shown in Table 2 below. 
 
                                                 
1 The Household Budget Survey (CSO, 2008) strictly speaking covers nearly 5 quarters, from mid-October of 
2004 to the fourth quarter of 2005.  Note that all averages based on the HBS in this paper are adjusted for 
representativeness using CSO grossing factors. 
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Table 2: Indicative fuel poverty rate (10% expenditure measure) for Q1 2008, extrapolated from 2005 
using average disposable income growth and increases in fuel prices. 
Year Share of households Number of households 
2008 est. 19.4% 301,368 
Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
 
Note that these results are only indicative. Fuel costs are adjusted for average price rises 
during the period 2005-2008. Household incomes are adjusted using the national average rise 
in disposable incomes, and these may not accurately reflect the experience in households with 
low incomes. The projected increase in fuel poverty comes about because fuel prices rose 
faster than incomes on average over the period; no allowance is made for changes between 
these years, e.g. in household energy efficiency or choice of fuels. 
It is important to note that vulnerability to fuel poverty does not bear a simple relation to 
income, even when one uses the expenditure approach to estimate it. Figure 1 below shows 
the share of each income decile that is fuel poor according to the Boardman definition (10% 
of disposable income after housing costs).2  In contrast to the suggestion in SEI (2008b) that 
fuel poverty mainly affects those in the first income decile,3 we find that only about 61% of 
households in the first decile are fuel poor on the Boardman definition, and significant 
proportions of the second and third deciles are also within this threshold. Simply comparing 
average energy use with income by decile conceals the wide variation in energy use within 
each decile. 
 
                                                 
2 Adjusting household income for numbers of inhabitants, giving income per person equivalent, would have a 
minor effect on numbers of fuel poor because numerator and denominator would be similarly adjusted. Their 
placing in the deciles would alter however.  
3 SEI 2008b, p.22. 
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Figure 1: Fuel poverty rate (10% expenditure measure) by disposable income decile, 2005 
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Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
 
2.2 Subjective measure     
‘Subjective’ indicators of fuel poverty are self-reported indicators based on householders’ 
statements made in response to survey questions. A recent paper (Waddams Price et al. 
(2008) compares this type of measure with expenditure fuel poverty using survey results from 
the UK. They find that the two approaches give positively correlated results and both are 
negatively correlated with income; however, there are many households that exhibit 
subjective fuel poverty but do not spend more than 10% of their incomes on fuel or vice 
versa. 
Data available for Ireland do not allow us to estimate expenditure and subjective fuel poverty 
measures for the same sample, but we can do them separately. Subjective indicators for 
Ireland during the period 1994 to 2006 are presented in Table 3 below. 
 
 7
Table 3: Self-reported estimates of fuel poverty in Ireland between 1994 and 2006 
 
 A: Households reporting that 
they cannot afford to heat 
their homes adequately 
B: Households that had to go 
without heating in the past year 
due to lack of money 
Composite Indicator 
(A, B or both) 
Year Survey 
Share of 
Households 
(%) 
Number of 
Households 
Share of 
Households 
(%) 
Number of 
Households 
Share of 
Households 
(%) 
Number of 
Households 
1994 ECHPa 8.0 87,000     
1995 ECHPa 5.9 65,000     
1996 ECHPa 6.5 73,000     
1997 ECHPa 5.1 58,000     
1998 LIIb 4.2 49,000     
1999 LIIb 3.1 37,000     
2000 LIIb 3.9 48,000     
2001 LIIb 3.3 41,000     
2002  n/a n/a n/a n/a   
2003 SILC 3.5c 47,000 7.8 d 104,000 8.9 119,000 
2004 SILC 3.7c 51,000 5.7 d 79,000 6.9 95,000 
2005 SILC 4.0c 57,000 6.5d 93,000 7.7 110,000 
2006 SILC 4.6c 68,000 6.6 d 97,000 8.1 119,000 
Notes: ECHP = European Community Household Panel; LII = Living In Ireland Survey; SILC = EU Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions, anonymised microdata file; households in Ireland from ESRI databank. 
a Question: “There are some things many people cannot afford even if they would like them. Can I just check 
whether your household can afford these, if you want them?... - Keeping your home adequately warm” 
b Question: “Would like but cannot afford adequate heating” 
c Question: “Does the household keep the home adequately warm? (If no, is it because the household can not 
afford to or is there another reason)” 
d Question: “Have you ever had to go without heating during the last 12 months through lack of money? (I mean 
have you had to go without a fire on a cold day, or go to bed to keep warm or light the fire late because of lack of 
coal/fuel?) 
 
Self-reported fuel poverty rates show a striking pattern of decline from the earliest available 
data through to about 2001/2, and there is some evidence of an increase thereafter. The 
decline corresponds to a period of very rapid growth in employment and GNP in Ireland, 
while GNP grew more slowly and consumer prices (including those for fuel) grew more 
quickly during the subsequent period.  
During the earlier period, other questions had also been posed, asking respondents whether 
they were “Unable to pay scheduled utility bills” and whether they had “Inadequate heating 
facilities”. The answers to these showed a similar pattern to the answers in Table 3 but with 
slightly higher shares reporting the latter “inadequate heating facilities”. 
A further survey, which was undertaken by the Urban Institute in 2001, gave a figure of 
42,000 households (4.7% of households) as saying that they were “usually not” or “never” 
“able to adequately heat the home” (Healy and Clinch, 2002). This is also similar to the figure 
of 42,604 in Table 3 above. An additional 165,000 households (12.7% of households) 
however said that they had intermittent difficulties, giving a total that is closer to the 
expenditure measure. 
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The main observations are that the subjective measure indicates that the numbers of fuel poor 
are significantly lower than numbers obtained by the expenditure measure above, but that the 
fall in this measure up to 2001 seems to have been reversed in more recent years. 
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3. Identifying types of households that are vulnerable to fuel poverty 
In this section, we use the most recent (2005) Household Budget Survey to examine the 
household characteristics associated with fuel poverty. The HBS contains detailed 
information on household income and expenditures, which makes it well suited to analysing 
fuel poverty assessed according to the expenditure measure. However, it does not include 
subjective questions on fuel poverty. 
3.1 Factors associated with fuel poverty 
Previous research has suggested an important association between household structure and 
fuel poverty (SEI, 2003). We show the relationship in Figure 2 below, which gives the shares 
of households with the structures on the left-hand axis that spend 10% or more of their 
disposable income on heating and light . A remarkable cluster of households occurs in the 
categories with a single adult, namely, a single adult with children, a single adult aged 65 or 
more, and a single adult in the 14 to 64 age range.  
 
Figure 2: Fuel poverty rate (10% expenditure measure) by household structure, 2005 
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Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
 
The relationship between fuel poverty and housing tenure, shown in Figure 3 below, indicates 
that households living in rented Local Authority accommodation are particularly susceptible 
to fuel poverty, with over one quarter of such households spending more than 10% of 
disposable income on fuel and light.  
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Figure 3: Fuel poverty rate (10% expenditure measure) by housing tenure, 2005 
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Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
 
 
Healy and Clinch (2002) reported a very similar tenure pattern using data from a 2001 survey. 
This association may partly be causal, e.g. because local authority tenants do not own their 
properties and thus have less scope and weaker incentives to make investments in appliance 
efficiency and household energy-saving measures (although government may do so on their 
behalf). However, a more obvious explanation is that both fuel poverty and tenure are likely 
to be affected by other variables. For example, low incomes and limited access to credit 
would tend to increase the likelihood of local authority tenancy and make a household 
vulnerable to fuel poverty. Later in this section we will use regression analysis to try to 
untangle such overlapping associations between factors. 
The prevalence of fuel poverty (10% expenditure measure) among households with one adult 
was already highlighted above. Here in Figure 4 the marital status of the household’s chief 
economic supporter is categorised and a strong concentration among households consisting of 
widowed persons is seen, where over 35% of such households were spending 10% or more of 
their disposable income on household energy. 
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Figure 4: Fuel poverty rate (10% expenditure measure) by marital status of household's chief economic 
supporter, 2005 
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Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
 
The split between urban and rural households is given in Figure 5 below. Farm households in 
turn are split in to non-farm and farm households; however, we find little evidence of an 
urban/rural divergence in the incidence of fuel poverty.  
 
Figure 5: Fuel poverty rate (10% expenditure measure) by urban/rural and farm/non-farm location of 
household, 2005 
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Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
 
 12
3.2 Vulnerability to energy price fluctuations 
The illustrations given thus far have been static in nature. Another dimension of the fuel 
poverty problem concerns the vulnerability of households to changes in fuel prices. Under the 
expenditure method, the effect of rising energy prices in the absence of any increase in 
incomes is to raise the numbers in fuel poverty, and we can illustrate the impact of such a 
change. The effect of postulated increases in energy prices in 2005 on their own is estimated 
in Figure 6. Here we see the actual 15.9% fuel poverty rate for 2005 in the centre of the 
figure. The bars on the right-hand-side show how the numbers in fuel poverty would rise for 
every 3% increase in overall household energy prices. It shows for example how a 9% price 
rise would raise the share in fuel poverty by some 2.7 percentage points to over 18%. The 
nearly uniform gradient is an indication of a fairly smooth gradient in incomes.  
 
Figure 6: Effect of changing energy prices on 2005 fuel poverty rate (10% expenditure measure), holding 
earnings constant 
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Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
 
The effect of price rises applied to individual fuels, one at a time, is shown in Figure 7 below. 
Sensitivity to the price of electricity is highest as it is on average the highest item of energy 
expenditure in the household budget. A 10% rise in electricity price would push another 0.9% 
of households in to the fuel poor category (using the expenditure measure).  
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Figure 7: Increase in fuel poverty rate (10% expenditure measure) associated with 10% rise in price of 
individual energy goods, holding income and prices of other goods constant, 2005 
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Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
 
Another way of looking at the link between energy prices and fuel poverty is to estimate the 
effects of a hypothetical carbon tax. We do this in Figure 8 below, assuming that the tax 
applies to all household fuels apart from electricity (which is already covered by the ETS 
mechanism). The relationship between the tax rate and projected fuel poverty rate is broadly 
linear over the range we have modelled. Note, however, that the fuel poverty increases we 
project in this chart could be prevented by recycling part of the revenue from the tax, along 
the lines discussed in Callan et al. 2008. 
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Figure 8: Effect of a carbon tax (Euro per tonne of carbon dioxide) on the fuel poverty rate (10% 
expenditure measure) before recycling of tax receipts 
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Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file and SEI emission factors. 
 
3.3 The role of fuel choice 
Although the incidence of fuel poverty does not appear to be sensitive to the price of coal, 
there is an important relationship between use of solid fuels and income. Scott (1992) noted 
the tendency for the lowest quartile of earners to employ solid fuels for winter heating, 
whereas the higher quartiles tend to use gas or oil, and this picture is still relevant today. 
Table 4 below shows, for each disposable income decile, the share of households using 
various types of systems for winter space heating. Here deciles are based on equivalised 
income, that is, income per person equivalent to give a truer idea of household income. Oil-
fired central heating is the most important system used in most deciles (particularly the 
middle income ones). However, there are big differences across deciles when one compares 
gas heating to solid fuels. While many better-off households use piped gas or LPG central 
heating and very few use solid fuels, the opposite is true for lower-income households. 
Indeed, 7% of households in the bottom decile report that they use open fires for winter space 
heating. With open fires delivering 20-30% efficiency compared to 65-90% for central 
heating boilers and even at current relatively high prices of central heating fuels (SEI 2008), 
this suggests that a large group of lower-income households get much less useful heat for 
each Euro of heating expenditure than their better-off counterparts, as well as having less 
money to spend.  
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We can also look directly at the relationship between heating system and fuel poverty (see 
Figure 9 below). Heating systems for which the ‘fuel poor’ bar extends to the left of the 
overall fuel poverty rate are those used more intensively by the fuel poor than the non fuel 
poor population. The main ones include solid fuel heater or cooker, open fire and back boiler 
central heating. 
 
Figure 9: Share of fuel poor (10% expenditure method) in total households using each type of winter 
space heating system 
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Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
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Table 4: Winter space heating appliance used by households, shares for each decile in 2005 
   Equivalised disposable income deciles     
Heating type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Oil central heating (CH) 42% 43% 47% 53% 55% 56% 60% 56% 55% 46% 
  Back Boiler CH 7% 7% 6% 5% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
  Piped gas or LPG CH 19% 19% 21% 23% 21% 26% 28% 32% 33% 46% 
  Solid fuel CH 13% 14% 10% 10% 9% 8% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
  Electric CH 5% 4% 5% 2% 4% 1% 2% 3% 3% 2% 
  Other CH 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 0% 
  Open Fire 7% 5% 4% 2% 2% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 
  Solid fuel heater or cooker 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 
  Electric - storage heater 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 
  Electric - other fixed appliance 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  Electric - portable appliance 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  Other 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file 
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It is also clear from the available data that lower income households wish to upgrade the 
fuels they use. Table 5 below shows the 2005 income elasticity of demand for each of the 
main fuels used for winter space heating.  
 
Table 5: Income elasticities of demand for household fuels 
Elasticities at sample means in 2005 
  
 Fuel Coal Oil Gas Electricity 
 0.216 -0.329 0.270 0.391 0.346 
      
1994-95 Elasticity estimates from Conniffe (2000) 
 
 0.250 -0.290 0.960 0.750 0.350 
      
Elasticities at decile means 
   
Decile      
1 0.314 -0.231 0.443 0.836 0.686 
2 0.288 -0.297 0.362 0.561 0.578 
3 0.252 -0.247 0.338 0.525 0.474 
4 0.222 -0.273 0.268 0.502 0.361 
5 0.208 -0.244 0.277 0.399 0.330 
6 0.209 -0.329 0.253 0.431 0.318 
7 0.199 -0.371 0.254 0.333 0.294 
8 0.189 -0.512 0.222 0.347 0.279 
9 0.184 -0.563 0.210 0.296 0.270 
10 0.172 -0.702 0.221 0.218 0.249 
Source: analysis of CSO 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata file. 
 
These elasticities represent the percentage change in demand to be expected from a 1% 
change in household income. We show both the average elasticities for the Household 
Budget Survey sample and the elasticities for each of the income deciles.4  For 
comparison, elasticity estimates for 1994-95 are also shown (from Conniffe 2000). The 
first column gives the elasticity of demand for fuel expenditures as a whole, while the 
other columns give the figures for specific fuels.  
As one might expect, the estimates show that household fuel demand is inelastic with 
respect to income. It alters with income changes but less than proportionately. Particularly 
for the highest income deciles, additional income tends to be spent on goods other than 
fuel. Most well-off households probably enjoy a sufficiently high standard of home 
heating and lighting; however, modest increases in expenditure continue as income rises 
                                                 
4 The elasticities are estimated using regression analysis of the 2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised 
data file.  We fit a semi-log relationship between income and fuel expenditures as discussed in Conniffe 
2000, Chapter 4. 
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because richer households have an appetite for goods that are complementary with energy 
expenditure, such as larger houses and electrical goods. 
The highest elasticity is for purchase of gas by low-income households, whereas purchase 
of coal has a negative elasticity for all households. Coal appears to be an inferior good, as 
suggested by previous research (Conniffe 2000): households using coal tend to switch to 
other fuels when their incomes rise, and particularly to gas in the case of poor households. 
3.4 Multivariate regression models of the incidence of fuel poverty 
The results shown in the earlier part of this section, as well as earlier research (e.g. SEI, 
2003), indicate that many household characteristics are associated with vulnerability to 
fuel poverty. However, these characteristics also tend to be correlated with one another, 
which makes it more difficult to assess their relative importance. To help isolate the 
specific effects of the main characteristics associated with fuel poverty, we employ 
regression analysis.  
We start by modelling the households that are fuel poor based on the 10% expenditure 
method, then model the subjective measure, and finally compare the two. A similar 
comparative analysis has been carried out for the UK by Waddams Price et al. (2008). 
Regressions using the expenditure measure 
The dataset used is the 2005 CSO Household Budget Survey microdata file, which 
contains information on 6,884 households in Ireland. Since our dependent variable is 
discrete (i.e. Poor vs. Not Poor), we use a logit estimator.  
The model predicts whether a given household will be fuel poor based on its location 
(urban/rural), housing tenure, family structure, accommodation type, quarter in which it 
was surveyed, and several characteristics of its Chief Economic Supporter (CES):5 marital 
status, sex, age, social class, educational qualification and work status. A list of the 
variables included in the model and some descriptive statistics on them are set out in 
Table 6 below. 
We have not included income as an explanatory variable in the model, although it might 
seem logical to do so. Income is used to calculate the dependent variable, so including it 
on the right-hand side of the equation as well would reduce the model to an identity. 
                                                 
5 The person in the household with the highest gross income. 
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Two versions of the model were estimated: one including all available variables and a 
second “preferred” model that omits explanatory variables that are not significant.6  The 
results are shown in Table 7 below. The two models appear to have a similar level of fit, 
with over 75% of observations correctly classified, so the second model (with fewer 
variables) is to be preferred.  
For each explanatory variable we chose a reference category, which is essentially a 
baseline against which households with different characteristics may be compared. The 
odds ratio shown in the table for each characteristic reflects the odds that a household 
with that characteristic will be fuel poor, relative to a household in the reference category. 
An odds ratio of 1 would indicate that households with that characteristic would be 
equally likely to be fuel poor as those in the reference category. An odds ratio greater than 
1 indicates a higher risk of fuel poverty, while a ratio below 1 indicates a lower risk. 
                                                 
6 A joint zero restriction on these coefficients was not rejected: χ2(27) = 34.9 [0.141] 
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Table 6: Variables used in fuel poverty regressions (using the 10% expenditure measure) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 
Dependent variable   
fuelpoor* 15.9% 36.5% 
Location of household   
rural 30.2% 45.9% 
urban 69.8% 45.9% 
Tenure   
owner-occupier 48.7% 50.0% 
owner with mortgage 33.1% 47.1% 
private tenant 11.0% 31.3% 
local authority tenant 7.16% 25.8% 
Accommodation type 
detached 48.1% 50.0% 
semi-detached 48.6% 50.0% 
flat/apartment 2.6% 16.0% 
bedsit 0.2% 4.3% 
other 0.5% 7.3% 
Family structure   
1 adult 14-64 13.0% 33.6% 
1 adult 65+ 13.2% 33.8% 
married couple 19.9% 39.9% 
married couple, 1 child 4.74% 21.3% 
married couple, 2 
children 
6.70% 25.0% 
married couple, 3 
children 
4.19% 20.0% 
married couple, 4 
children 
1.52% 12.2% 
single adult with 
children 
1.66% 12.8% 
other households 35.1% 47.7% 
Marital status of chief economic supporter (CES) 
married 57.5% 49.4% 
single 24.4% 42.9% 
widow/widower 11.9% 32.4% 
divorced/separated 6.21% 24.1% 
Sex of CES   
male 63.6% 48.1% 
female 36.4% 48.1% 
Age of CES   
age 0-14 0.018% 1.35% 
age 15-24 4.80% 21.3% 
age 25-34 15.0% 35.7% 
age 35-44 21.8% 41.3% 
age 45-54 20.2% 40.2% 
age 55-64 15.6% 36.3% 
age 65-74 13.2% 33.8% 
age 75+ 9.42% 29.2% 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 
Highest level of education attained by CES 
educ: no formal 0.357% 5.95% 
educ: primary 21.0% 40.7% 
educ: Inter/Junior cert 21.1% 40.8% 
educ: Leaving Cert 25.4% 43.5% 
educ: sub degree 11.5% 32.0% 
educ: primary degree 11.3% 31.7% 
educ: higher degree 7.59% 26.5% 
educ: still in education 1.70% 12.9% 
Social Class of CES   
sc: employers & 
managers 
12.8% 33.4% 
sc: higher professional 6.69% 25.0% 
sc: lower professional 13.5% 34.2% 
sc: non-manual 14.8% 35.5% 
sc: manual skilled 11.3% 31.7% 
sc: semi-skilled 7.25% 25.9% 
sc: unskilled 5.73% 23.2% 
sc: own account work 4.38% 20.5% 
sc: farmers 5.81% 23.4% 
sc: agric workers 1.00% 10.0% 
sc: all others 16.7% 37.3% 
Employment status of CES 
full-time employee 47.9% 50.0% 
part-time employee 5.4% 22.7% 
self-employed 12.3% 32.9% 
other working 0.9% 9.7% 
out of work 2.3% 15.1% 
home duties 9.0% 28.7% 
retired 15.7% 36.4% 
permanent incapacity 4.5% 20.7% 
student & other 1.9% 13.5% 
Date household surveyed 
Q4 2004 11.0% 31.3% 
Q1 2005 23.5% 42.4% 
Q2 2005 24.5% 43.0% 
Q3 2005 21.1% 40.8% 
Q4 2005 19.9% 40.0% 
   
Note: CSO grossing factors were used to adjust 
these figures for representativeness. 
 
* The household spends at least 10% of its 
disposable income after tax on fuel and 
electricity. 
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Table 7: Regression results explaining fuel poverty (expenditure measure) as a function of household 
characteristics; logit estimator 
Variables and statistics All variables Preferred model 
Dep. variable fuelpoor fuelpoor 
 Odds ratio Std. Err. Odds ratio Std. Err. 
rural (REF)     
urban 1.03 0.114   
owner-occupier (REF)     
owner with bank mortgage 1.26 0.212   
owner with local auth. mortgage 1.38 0.196** 1.33 0.170** 
private tenant 1.57 0.246*** 1.49 0.212*** 
local authority tenant 1.29 0.187* 1.32 0.179** 
accom: detached house (REF)     
accom: semi-detached 0.646 0.069*** 0.669 0.06*** 
accom: flat/apartment 0.327 0.096*** 0.337 0.096*** 
accom: bedsit 0.101 0.111** 0.116 0.126** 
accom: other 0.33 0.194* 0.337 0.197* 
single‡ 1.75 0.310*** 1.91 0.203*** 
married‡ (REF)     
widow/widower‡ 1.65 0.330** 1.51 0.196*** 
divorced/separated‡ 2.12 0.423*** 2.38 0.362*** 
male‡ (REF)     
female‡ 1.32 0.146** 1.29 0.134** 
1 adult 14-64 1.20 0.268   
1 adult 65+ 1.00 0.211   
married couple, no children (REF)     
married couple, 1 child 0.885 0.225   
married couple, 2 children 0.844 0.193   
married couple, 3 children 0.960 0.251   
married couple, 4 children 0.690 0.274   
single adult with children 1.11 0.281   
other households 0.455 0.0725*** 0.462 0.0444*** 
age_15-24‡ 1.49 0.350* 1.48 0.319* 
age_25-34‡ (REF)     
age_35-44‡ 0.883 0.138   
age_45-54‡ 0.961 0.170   
age_55-64‡ 1.07 0.205   
age_65-74‡ 0.697 0.166   
age_75+‡ 0.678 0.170   
sc: employers & managers‡ 0.595 0.122** 0.538 0.0961*** 
sc: higher professional‡ 0.707 0.207   
sc: lower professional‡ 0.618 0.117** 0.602 0.0991*** 
sc: non-manual‡ (REF)     
sc: manual skilled‡ 1.13 0.192   
sc: semi-skilled‡ 1.17 0.210   
sc: unskilled‡ 1.27 0.240   
sc: own account work‡ 1.38 0.378   
sc: farmers‡ 1.54 0.337** 1.27 0.197 
sc: agric workers‡ 0.376 0.186** 0.328 0.157** 
sc: all others‡ 0.909 0.178   
educ: no formal‡ 1.24 0.711   
educ: primary‡ 1.69 0.206*** 1.52 0.140*** 
educ: Inter/Junior Cert‡ 1.18 0.139   
educ: Leaving Cert‡ (REF)     
educ: sub degree‡ 0.986 0.158   
educ: primary degree‡ 0.673 0.139* 0.580 0.110*** 
educ higher degree‡ 0.447 0.135*** 0.365 0.102*** 
educ: still in education‡ 0.772 0.629   
work status: full-time employee‡ (REF)     
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Variables and statistics All variables Preferred model 
work status: part-time employee‡ 3.18 0.601*** 3.16 0.578*** 
work status: self-employed‡ 2.96 0.633*** 3.22 0.514*** 
work status: other working‡ 3.42 1.24*** 3.49 1.24*** 
work status: out of work‡ 12.8 2.70*** 13.3 2.72*** 
work status: home duties‡ 12.8 2.89*** 10.2 1.66*** 
work status: retired‡ 7.75 1.363*** 6.15 0.853*** 
work status: permanent incapacity‡ 9.04 2.16*** 8.47 1.54*** 
work status: student & other‡ 8.77 6.85*** 5.78 1.62*** 
Q4 2004 (REF)     
Q1 2005 1.03 0.139   
Q2 2005 0.780 0.107* 0.760 0.0774*** 
Q3 2005 0.598 0.0865*** 0.580 0.0642*** 
Q4 2005 0.705 0.101** 0.687 0.0752*** 
   
Observations 6,884 6,884 
LR χ2(56) 1,330 [0.00]  
LR χ2(31)  1,300 [0.00] 
Pseudo R2 0.233 0.228 
Pearson Goodness of Fit test χ2(6011) 5,970 [0.00]  
Pearson Goodness of Fit test χ2(2981)  3,150 [0.00] 
Classification results Cutoffs Cutoffs 
 0.5 sample mean 0.5 sample 
mean 
Correctly classified 86.1% 76.5% 86.1% 75.7% 
Sensitivity 21.4% 76.9% 20.2% 76.8% 
Specificity 97.1% 76.4% 97.4% 75.5% 
   
Note: ‘REF’ indicates reference categories; *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively. ‡ Relates to Chief Economic Supporter in household. Numbers in brackets 
are p-values. Data sources: see Table 6 above. 
 
Many household characteristics prove to have a significant association with fuel poverty. 
We find that households who are tenants (with either private or local authority landlords) 
or are purchasing their houses through local authority schemes are more likely to be fuel 
poor than those who own their residences outright. This finding echoes the descriptive 
analysis discussed in Section 3. The coefficients on these tenancy variables are not 
significantly different from one another, which is consistent with the idea that rental 
tenancy per se increases the likelihood of fuel poverty because tenants cannot always 
appropriate the full benefits of any efficiency-improving investments they make. 
The type of accommodation matters too, with detached houses having a stronger 
association with fuel poverty than semi-detached houses, apartments or bedsits. This may 
reflect the larger average size and external wall space of detached houses, which implies a 
higher cost of heating them to a given comfort level. Inhabitants of flats and apartments 
are two-thirds less likely to be fuel poor based on the expenditure measure than those in 
detached houses, all other things equal. 
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Divorce/separation is a strong risk factor, with over double the likelihood of fuel poverty 
relative to households with a married CES, while being single or a widow/widower has a 
similar but somewhat weaker association. 
Households with a female CES are about 30% more likely to be fuel poor than those 
headed by males, perhaps reflecting lower average female earnings. In contrast to other 
empirical analyses of poverty in Ireland, single parent households appear to be no more 
vulnerable to fuel poverty than households made up of a married couple with no children. 
However, it seems likely that the single parent effect is being picked up by a combination 
of other characteristics in the model, such as female CES and work status. “Other” 
households appear to be significantly less prone to fuel poverty than any other family 
structure; this category includes households with more than two adults. 
The age of the CES has only a limited association with fuel poverty once work status 
(which identifies those that are retired or long-term disabled) is included in the model. 
The odds of being fuel poor on the expenditure measure are about 50% higher for 
households with a CES in the 15-24 age bracket compared to our reference category (aged 
25-34), but this result is only marginally statistically significant. 
The results for social class and highest education qualification obtained by the CES are 
much as one would expect: higher social class and level of educational qualifications are 
associated with lower levels of fuel poverty, probably because these characteristics are 
strongly correlated with income. Most other categories show no significant different to the 
reference category (non-manual), but agricultural workers show a surprisingly low rate. 
However, the number of households in our sample with a CES in this category is very 
small (c. 1%), so the result may not be robust. 
The strongest set of associations in both economic and statistical terms is with work 
status. Taking households where the CES was a full-time employee as the reference case, 
all other status categories show a significant positive association with the rate of fuel 
poverty. Households with a CES in other employment categories are about three times 
more likely to be fuel poor, while those in non-working categories have still higher odds. 
The extreme cases, households with a CES who is unemployed or engaged in home 
duties, appear to be almost 13 times more likely to be fuel poor than those with a full-time 
employed CES. 
We also estimated an extended model including variables for the year in which each 
household’s residence was built, but these variables were not significant. 
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Regressions using the subjective measure 
The dataset used in these regressions is the Irish component of the 2005 Survey of Income 
and Living Conditions (SILC) anonymised microdata file, which includes information on 
6,085 households. Although more recent (2006) data are available, 2005 data are used to 
maintain comparability with the HBS results shown above. 
The model predicts whether a given household reports a subjective experience of fuel poverty based 
on its location (urban/rural), housing tenure (rented/other), accommodation type, family structure 
and several characteristics of its Chief Economic Supporter (CES):7 marital status, sex, age, work 
status, social class and educational qualification. A list of the variables included in the model and 
some descriptive statistics on them are set out in  
Table 8 below. 
 
                                                 
7 The person in the household with the highest gross income. 
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Table 8: Variables used in subjective fuel poverty regressions 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 
Dependent variable   
fuelpoor* 7.73% 26.7% 
Location of household   
rural 37.3% 48.4% 
urban 62.7% 48.4% 
Tenure   
residence owned 47.7% 50.0% 
residence rented 15.3% 36.0% 
Accommodation type   
House 42.9 42.5% 
Flat or apartment 19.8% 39.8% 
Unknown 0.296% 5.43% 
Family structure   
1 adult, no children 21.7% 41.2% 
2 adults, no children 25.5% 43.6% 
3+ adults, no children 19.1% 39.3% 
1 adult, 1+ children 4.01% 19.6% 
2 adults, 1-3 children 18.6% 38.9% 
other households with 
children 
11.1% 31.4% 
Marital status of chief economic supporter (CES) 
married 49.3% 50.0% 
single 30.7% 46.1% 
widow/widower 11.6% 32.0% 
divorced/separated 8.38% 27.7% 
Sex of CES   
male 62.9% 48.3% 
female 37.1% 48.3% 
Work status of CES 
employed 55.6% 49.7% 
unemployed 2.97% 17.0 
student 1.07% 10.3% 
home duties 14.7% 35.5% 
retired or otherwise 
inactive 
19.9% 39.9% 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 
Ill/disabled 5.31% 22.4% 
Highest level of education attained by CES 
educ: no formal/primary 28.3% 45.1% 
educ: lower secondary 18.3% 38.7% 
educ: upper secondary 18.0% 38.4% 
educ: post-Leaving Cert 8.23% 27.5% 
educ: third level – non 
degree 
8.63% 28.1% 
educ: third level – 
degree or above 
17.9% 38.3% 
educ: other/not stated 0.638% 7.96% 
Social Class of CES   
sc: managers & 
administrators 
18.0% 38.4% 
sc: professional 10.1% 30.1% 
sc: associate 
professional & technical 
7.83% 26.9% 
sc: clerical & secretarial 7.82% 26.9% 
sc: craft & related 11.9% 32.3% 
sc: personal & 
protective service 
9.40% 29.2% 
sc: sales 4.76% 21.3% 
sc: plant & machine 
operatives 
9.33% 29.1% 
sc: other 20.9% 40.7% 
   
Note: CSO grossing factors were used to adjust 
these figures for representativeness. 
 
* Households were classified as fuel poor if they 
answered ‘yes’ to one or both of these questions: 
inability of household to afford to keep the house 
adequately warm or household had to go without 
heating in the last 12 months through lack of 
money. 
 
 
 
 
We tried to match the variables used in the expenditure measure regressions discussed 
above, but differences in the surveys allowed only an approximate match. The coding of 
family structure differs significantly between the two surveys, and the anonymised SILC 
does not include as much detail in the age or tenure variables as the HBS.  
We again use a logit estimator, but in this case the dependent variable is a composite 
subjective indicator. We designate a household as fuel poor if it has answered ‘yes’ to 
either or both of two deprivation indicators associated with home heating: “Does the 
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household keep the home adequately warm? (If no, is it because the household can not 
afford to or is there another reason)” and “Have you ever had to go without heating during 
the last 12 months through lack of money? (I mean have you had to go without a fire on a 
cold day, or go to bed to keep warm or light the fire late because of lack of coal/fuel?). 
While these two sub-indicators are positively correlated, they are not perfectly correlated. 
This means that the sample proportion designated as fuel poor in 2005 (7.7%) is higher 
than either of the components (6.5% for adequate warmth and 4.0% for going without 
heating in the past year, as reported earlier in Table 3).  
As before, two versions of the model were estimated: one including all available variables 
and a second “preferred” model that omits explanatory variables that are not significant.8  
The results are shown in Table 9 below.  
 
Table 9: Regression results explaining subjective fuel poverty as a function of household 
characteristics; logit estimator 
Variables and statistics All variables Preferred model 
Dep. variable fuelpoor fuelpoor 
 Odds ratio Std. Err. Odds ratio Std. Err. 
rural (REF)     
urban 1.08 0.137   
residence owned (REF)     
residence rented 2.02 0.275*** 2.09 0.279*** 
dwelling: house (REF)     
dwelling: flat/apartment 1.26 0.169* 1.28 0.159** 
dwelling: type unknown 2.11 1.16   
single‡ 1.99 0.33*** 2.07 0.313*** 
married‡ (REF)     
widow/widower‡ 1.42 0.319 1.49 0.307* 
divorced/separated‡ 3.02 0.593*** 3.17 0.585*** 
male‡ (REF)     
female‡ 1.31 0.192* 1.24 0.169 
1 adult, no children (REF) 0.98 0.167   
2 adults, no children      
3+ adults, no children 0.92 0.207   
1 adult, 1+ children 1.61 0.382** 1.805 0.376*** 
2 adults, 1-3 children 1.74 0.353*** 1.85 0.335*** 
other households with children 1.57 0.349** 1.75 0.355*** 
age <65‡ (REF)     
age 65+‡ 0.46 0.087*** 0.459 0.086*** 
sc: managers & administrators‡ 1.08 0.261   
sc: professional‡ 0.602 0.227   
sc: associate professional & technical‡ 0.644 0.223   
sc: clerical & secretarial‡ 1.11 0.299   
sc: craft & related‡ (REF)     
sc: personal & protective service‡ 1.17 0.281   
sc: sales‡ 1.096 0.314   
sc: plant & machine operatives‡ 1.38 0.333   
                                                 
8 A joint zero restriction on these coefficients was not rejected: χ2(16) = 21.3 [0.169] 
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Variables and statistics All variables Preferred model 
sc: other‡ 1.19 0.245   
employed‡ (REF)     
unemployed‡ 5.93 1.23*** 6.25 1.268*** 
student‡ 4.33 1.42*** 4.72 1.506*** 
home duties‡ 2.76 0.52*** 3.16 0.579*** 
retired or otherwise inactive‡ 2.55 0.537*** 2.69 0.557*** 
Ill/disabled‡ 4.11 0.793*** 4.60 0.859*** 
educ: no formal/primary‡ 1.51 0.272** 1.54 0.194*** 
educ: lower secondary‡ 1.30 0.24   
educ: upper  secondary‡ (REF)     
educ: post-Leaving Cert‡ 1.13 0.289   
educ: third level – non degree‡ 0.930 0.254   
educ: third level – degree or above‡ 0.845 0.231   
educ: other/not stated‡ 4.07 1.86*** 3.80 1.70*** 
   
Observations 6,085 6,085 
LR χ2(33) 521 [0.00]  
LR χ2(17)  498 [0.00] 
Pseudo R2 0.165 0.158 
Pearson Goodness of Fit test χ2(3065) 3,320 [0.00]  
Pearson Goodness of Fit test χ2(581)  659 [0.00] 
Classification results Cutoffs Cutoffs 
 0.5 sample mean 0.5 sample 
mean 
Correctly classified 92.7% 77.9% 92.9% 78.3% 
Sensitivity 4.56% 63.6% 5.01% 60.8% 
Specificity 99.5% 80.1% 99.7% 79.6% 
   
Note: ‘REF’ indicates reference categories; *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively. ‡ Relates to Chief Economic Supporter in household. Numbers in brackets 
are p-values. Data sources: see  
Table 8 above. 
 
The fit of the subjective and expenditure models and their success at classification are 
broadly similar. The urban/rural split is again not significant. Also in common with the 
expenditure models, we find here that tenant households and those with a CES that is 
single, divorced/separated, female or has a low level of educational qualifications are 
more likely to be fuel poor than the corresponding reference groups. 
The positive association between having a non-employed CES and fuel poverty is also 
strong here, although the coefficients are not as high for categories such as ‘unemployed’ 
or ‘carrying out home duties’ than they were in the expenditure model. For example, in 
these models a household with an unemployed CES is about 6 times more likely to be fuel 
poor than one with an employed CES (compared to 13 in the expenditure models). 
However, this difference may be explained by the difference in the SILC reference 
category: it includes all employed persons, whereas the HBS analysis separated out those 
working part time or on employment programmes. 
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There are other more substantial differences between these model and the expenditure 
models. None of the social class categories is significant here, and the family structure 
variables suggest that having children in the family has a stronger association with fuel 
poverty than the number of adults. According to the subjective models, households living 
in apartments or flats are to be at a significantly higher risk of fuel poverty than those 
living in houses, whereas the expenditure models indicated a lower level of risk.  
The subjective models are associated with a strong age effect: having a CES over 65 years 
of age implies a much lower risk of fuel poverty compared to the reference category of 
<65. No significant effect involving the higher age bands was found in the expenditure 
models. 
Table 10 below summarises the associations found between a range of variables and fuel 
poverty (measured using the expenditure and subjective methods). We indicate the sign of 
the effect in each case where it was significant.  
 
Table 10: Summary of significant effects in regression models explaining expenditure and subjective 
measures of fuel poverty (+ denotes a significant positive association with fuel poverty, – means 
negative, the number of symbols indicates the significance level) 
 Expenditure 
measure 
Subjective 
measure 
Tenant  +++ +++ 
Purchasing accommodation via local 
authority 
++ n/a 
Apartment/flat – – – ++ 
1-2 adults with children  +++ 
Other family structure (incl. >2 adults) – – – +++ 
Single CES +++  
Widow/widower CES +++ + 
Divorced/separated CES +++ +++ 
Female CES ++ +++ 
Age  <25 CES + n/a 
Age 65+ CES  – – – 
High social class CES 
(employers/managers) 
– – –  
High educational qualification CES 
(primary or higher degree) 
– – –  
Low educational qualification CES 
(primary) 
+++ +++ 
Work status other than ‘employed’ +++ +++ 
Note: +, ++ and +++/– – – denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively 
Note: variables for which the expenditure and subjective models report opposite signs are shaded. 
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The patterns of vulnerability indicated by the subjective and expenditure models are very 
similar despite some differences in the categories used in the two surveys. Most variables 
have the same sign, and in many cases the magnitudes of effects are similar too. There is 
strong evidence that the risk of fuel poverty is higher for those that are tenants or have a 
CES that is a widow/widower, divorced/separated, female, in a work status other than 
‘employed’ or has low educational qualifications. 
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4. Existing policies in Ireland 
As discussed, fuel poverty is the result of low income and poor energy efficiency. The 
price of energy is another causal factor:  fuel poverty increases when energy costs rise. 
This section outlines some policies and issues arising in the Republic of Ireland. 
Policies can be categorised into current and capital policies, or more specifically: 
• Income support 
• Improvement to energy efficiency of dwellings and equipment 
• Income support is also sometimes supplemented by subsidies or rebates to reduce the 
price.  
4.1 Income support policies and specific fuel allowances 
Subsidies to reduce the energy price per se can create difficulties that are well-
documented, not least fraud, disincentives to behaviour, and hidden costs. Such measures 
are now less common in the OECD, with most countries switching to income supports as 
a way of relieving immediate pressures on energy affordability. 
Measures dealing with income support in Ireland are described in official documents of 
the Department of Social and Family Affairs. There is of course generalised support 
offered through the social welfare system (e.g. to low income families and pensioners) 
through the pension and welfare system. However, the DSFA also provides direct 
assistance with the energy costs of those in receipt of social welfare and HSE payments 
and of other qualifying persons. These supports are the national fuel allowance; the 
electricity/gas allowance element of the household benefits package; and the 
supplementary welfare allowance – heating supplement. The rates are as follows: 
 
Fuel Allowance (30 weeks)  €18 per week 
Smokeless Fuel Allowance €3.80 per week 
 
Electricity Allowance  Standing charge and up to 2,400 kWh per year9 
Gas Allowance  Credit of €106.5 per 2-months in winter, €48.50 in 
summer 
Bottle gas  €43 per month 
 
The rationale behind the Free Electricity Allowance in the early days was explained in the 
Estimates Debate of 1967: 
                                                 
9 This is worth €475.50 at 2008 Dublin domestic electricity tariff. Memorandum item: the average 
household used 4431 kWh per year in 1999-2000 **** 
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We considered that this was much better than giving monetary increases because 
of the encouragement it gave to recipients to give themselves that amount of 
comfort of which they might deprive themselves, even if they had the necessary 
money. (Quinn, 2000) 
 
These payments are available to people who are in receipt of qualifying benefits, of which 
those aged 66 and over form a major share. 
We understand that about €350 million was provided to households as fuel allowances in 
2007. Details of expenditures and numbers of recipients are given in Tables 8 and 9 
below. 
 
Table 11: Fuel Allowance: 2004 to 2008 (in cash) 
Year Standard Fuel 
Allowance 
No. of Recipients 
Smokeless Supplement 
No. of Recipients 
Expenditure 
 
2004 272,000 121,000 € 84.7m 
2005 264,400 118,600 € 85.4m 
2006 274,000 123,000 €125.1m 
2007 286,200 117,800 €167.1m 
2008 (estimate) 290,000 120,000 €170.0m 
Source: DSFA 
 
Table 12: Electricity/Gas Allowance 2004 to 2008 (free fuel) 
Year No. of Recipients Expenditure 
2004 309,997 93.6m 
2005 323,256 110.3m 
2006 338,920 116.8m 
2007 348,812 162.0m 
Source: DSFA 
 
One persistent problem with delivering support through means-tested benefits is the 
tendency for many eligible people not to take up their entitlements. Income approaches to 
helping low income households to deal with the impacts of carbon taxes, for example, are 
discussed in Callan et al, 2008. Recent thinking is moving towards mainstream income 
supports, and away from albeit less costly focused supports to the household in the form 
of Fuel Allowances, outlined in earlier studies (Scott and Eakins, 2004). 
There are also many households that receive both the Fuel Allowance and the 
Electricity/Gas Allowance. Over half of recipients of the Fuel Allowance and nearly three 
quarters of those in receipt of Electricity/Gas Allowances receive both benefits. It should 
be noted that some people would spend a lot of time indoors for various reasons and could 
require more to be spent on keeping the home warm. The year 2007 saw an increase of 
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29% and 32%, respectively, in expenditure on these schemes in response to the rise in the 
price of fuels. 
 Ideally where shortcomings in the fabric of the dwelling stock and equipment are the 
cause of high expenditure on fuel, income support should be merely a stopgap until such 
inadequacies are remedied. The value foregone from omitting to upgrade buildings is well 
established and studies on this are outlined below. In practice, though, considerably more 
funding continues to be allocated to income support-type measures – €350 million or so in 
2007 – than to home upgrades. In the remainder of this section we discuss the rationale 
for capital-related measures and the scale of such interventions in Ireland. 
4.2 Policies for improving energy efficiency of dwellings and equipment - studies 
Improvements to the housing stock are a sine qua non for sensible policy on fuel poverty, 
and even more so with high energy prices prevailing in the foreseeable future.  
The value foregone, or loss of economic benefit from omitting to upgrade the energy 
efficiency of the housing stock has been documented abroad and in Ireland. An 
investigation for Ireland showed this to be the case from the comprehensive analysis of a 
potential large-scale energy efficiency programme. The programme, estimated in 2000 to 
cost some €1.6 billion, would have brought the Irish housing stock up to (the then current) 
1997 building regulations over a 10-year period.10 Savings were also found in an earlier 
study of a proposed small-scale scheme targeted at low-income homes.11  Such findings 
are consistent with a line of studies undertaken elsewhere.12  
One perceived drawback to home upgrades is the fact that in poor homes that are poorly 
heated prior to an upgrade, the outcome is that much of the potential energy saving is 
taken in the form of extra comfort – the “rebound effect”. This is logical: households now 
find that the cost of warmth per se becomes cheaper and the normal response to such price 
reduction is to consume more of the item or, at any rate, not much less of it. This has 
sometimes been presented as weakening the case for upgrades in low income homes, but 
this is to take a restricted and short-term view about the effect of such upgrades. It would 
                                                 
10 Brophy et al,1999, Homes for the 21st Century, and Clinch and Healy, 2000, Cost-
benefit analysis of domestic energy efficiency. The scheme would involve retrofitting the 
1.2 million dwellings built in Ireland prior to 1997 with various energy efficiency 
technologies and heating upgrades. The study combined eight dwelling types, six 
categories of insulation and 19 types of heating system.  
11 Scott, 1996. Social Welfare Fuel Allowances … to Heat the Sky?, ESRI WP 74. 
12 For example, Shorrock and Henderson, 1990. Energy use in buildings and carbon dioxide emissions.  
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be more appropriate to take the total welfare effect of such a programme into account, 
which involves treating the gain in comfort as a benefit of the scheme. 
It is to be noted that real incomes in the low end of the income distribution can change 
over time. They rose for example during the first half decade of the 2000s and more 
energy than necessary would have been consumed in these highly inefficient dwellings. 
The evidence that upgrades are still worthwhile even after ‘comfort take-back’ occurs is 
overwhelming. In their large-scale study Clinch and Healy indeed assume that the benefits 
of improving energy efficiency would be taken as extra comfort benefits up to what is 
considered to be a ‘comfortable’ mean internal temperature (defined as an average 
household temperature of 17.7oC) and all benefits remaining after this level is reached 
were assumed taken as energy/emissions saving. Their results were as follows: 
Applying static energy prices and 5% discount rate, the benefit to cost ratio in terms of 
energy benefits alone was 1.7 over the 30-year lifetime.  
Average annual energy savings would approach 0.6 million TOE. Only at discount rates 
above 11% did this net benefit not hold. Higher benefits would arise under higher energy 
prices, as have occurred in the meantime, meaning that their estimated benefits understate 
the benefits now. 
Environmental benefits add nearly a further 15% to the energy benefits, for which 
conservative valuations of emissions damages are used. The major damaging emissions 
are CO2 and PM10, and per tonne values of €5.19 and €1,547 were applied, respectively.  
The benefits of reduced mortality were also calculated and were based on a study of 
excess winter mortality from cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.13 The benefits of 
reduced sickness from cold and damp houses were estimated using a cost of illness 
approach. These estimates of reduced mortality and morbidity add another near-on 43% to 
the energy benefits above.  
As mentioned above, improved comfort was valued under the assumption that a share of 
the potential energy saving is taken as increased warmth in the home up to a certain level. 
The increased comfort also has a value to society and was estimated here to add a further 
17% to the energy benefits.  
The authors found that the overall benefit-cost ratio is “a resolute 3.0” but, as seen, energy 
benefits alone would allow the programme to pass the test, with a benefit-cost ratio of 1.7. 
                                                 
13   Clinch and Healy (2000).   
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Energy benefits represent the majority, at 57%, of total benefits. These are followed by 
benefits in mortality and health, comfort and emissions. The payback is seven years and 
the internal rate of return is 33%. For other studies, see Godacre et al, 2002.  
The last decade’s extensive literature on addressing fuel poverty by means of physical 
upgrades of dwellings and equipment has added pertinence now. Recent rises in the price 
of energy improves the benefit side and thus also the Net Present Value (NPV) of such 
investments. Incorporating a value on carbon reductions, which would be automatic under 
a carbon tax, further enhances the positive outcomes.  
Barriers to investment 
The question remains as to how to bring about the investments, seeing that they are not 
being undertaken despite their enticing financial benefits. A series of possible barriers to 
adoption have been identified and appraised.  
Policy-makers themselves can face difficulties when attempting to introduce policies that 
have long-term rather than immediate benefits. But this is not the only barrier, as spelt out 
in Brophy et al., 1997. Responsibility in the area of home upgrades is spread over about 
10 separate government departments, with no particular department being necessarily in a 
position to champion a programme of home upgrades. Moreover Irish policy has 
traditionally focussed on supply-side interventions, such as increasing energy supply, 
rather than on demand-side efficiency.  
A survey of the sorts of energy efficiency features that individual households have 
actually installed show the following to be important barriers: 
• lack of information  -  misperceptions about the merits; 
• small potential saving and hence low priority; 
• inability to appropriate the benefits -  as in rented accommodation; 
• restricted access to credit  - and interest rates facing individuals that are higher than 
the test rate used in the analyses; and 
• unwillingness to put up with extra hassle.  
 
Additionally, people could possibly be waiting for a grant. Furthermore, people on low 
incomes are likely to have relatively high discount rates, that is, the payback they would 
want would be shorter. Administering the upgrade and organising dealings with the 
construction industry require certain some degree of aptitude for construction 
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management and, importantly perhaps, it is only recently that the construction industry 
itself has shown enthusiasm for such retro-fit work.14  
Policies 
The power of such barriers is reduced as energy prices rise and would be further reduced 
if the environmental damage costs of fuel use were included in the energy price, as by a 
carbon tax. There are other sensible areas on which to focus policy intervention, besides a 
carbon tax. With information and hassle being such a prominent barrier, and given the 
economies of centralised information gathering, informed bodies such as SEI (Sustainable 
Energy Ireland) are well placed to be the major source of advice.15  
A major new initiative is The Home Energy Saving Scheme which was launched in 
April 2008. The initial pilot working on 2000 homes in North Tipperary, Limerick, Clare 
and Dundalk will inform the roll-out of the full scale €100 million national scheme 
envisaged in the Programme for Government. In the pilot, the home-owner will pay the 
first €100 towards the cost of a Building Energy Rating (BER) and advice on the works 
that are needed to improve their energy efficiency. The Government will subsequently 
cover up to 30% of the cost up to a maximum of €2,500.  
Importantly, there will be an assessment of the Scheme in terms of the ‘before and after’ 
energy usage and temperatures and such like, in order to learn which delivery modes and 
measures are most effective. In addition the Scheme will be able to provide invaluable 
information on Ireland’s GHG marginal abatement costs, which are likely to be negative 
as in the large-scale research study discussed above, unless costs get out of hand or 
measures (and unwarranted measures) are pursued to inordinate levels. In one of the 
interventions it is the intention of SEI, which administers the scheme, to get a grouping of 
houses to have the same work undertaken so that the cost to each individual householder 
comes down.  
                                                 
14  The Construction Industry Federation (CIF) recently pointed to the 0.9 million homes 
built before 1990. Improvements such as filling cavity walls, costing on average €10,000 
per house, would bring them up the energy efficiency scale from their ‘E’ or ‘D’ rating, at 
a cost of €9 billion, they said. 
15 For example a home energy survey can be undertaken using the information at 
http://www.sei.ie/index.asp?locID=118&docID=-1 , which shows the cost of energy saving 
investments and the paybacks expected.  
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The benefits of the Scheme, it should be noted, accrue mainly to the house-owner, in 
terms of a higher re-sale value of the home and increased comfort and savings on energy 
bills, the latter estimated by SEI to amount to up to €500 annually. The full scheme is 
expected to result in annual GHG savings of 175,000 tonnes. 
As mentioned, the financial benefits accrue to private individuals and support to the 
scheme is funded by public taxes. The support inevitably has to be higher in the absence 
of carbon taxes because the value of savings on energy will be depressed, which will 
depress investment if they do not reflect ensuing emissions reductions. As discussed in 
Section 0 above, certain identifiable categories of households are most at risk of fuel 
poverty, in particular those with one adult, especially widowed persons, households 
consisting of a single adult with child(ren), and those in rented local authority 
accommodation. These are the homes where 100% publically funded upgrades should 
ideally be targeted. If one can barely afford fuel it is unlikely that one could afford a share 
of the upgrade cost. 
Measures to encourage upgrading of homes in Ireland have also included the Warmer 
Homes Scheme and the Housing Aid for Older People Scheme. There is also direct 
investment in home upgrades in the Low Income Housing Scheme (doubled to €5 
million in 2008) and across the local authority housing stock supported by DEHLG 
funding, but we do not have data on the scale of this activity. 
SEI manages the Warmer Homes Scheme (WHS), which delivers upgrades through a 
network of 16 regional community-based organisations. The scheme focuses on 
households in receipt of the Fuel Allowance, invalidity and disability benefits, living in 
non-local authority homes. SEI estimates that these properties account for about two 
thirds of homes at risk. There is no charge (or a nominal one) to beneficiaries. 
The current Warmer Homes Scheme provides the following energy efficiency measures: 
• Attic insulation 
• Cavity wall insulation (where applicable) 
• Draught proofing 
• CFL bulbs 
• Lagging jackets 
• Energy advice 
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It does not presently cover solid wall properties, glazing or heating system upgrades. The 
scale of activity each year depends upon available funding, and at present the 
geographical coverage is limited to about half the country. Table 13 below summarises 
the upgrades delivered through the scheme in recent years. 
Table 13: Home upgrades delivered through the Warmer Homes Scheme in recent years 
Year Homes retro-
fitted 
Range of features covered 
(Additional features each year marked in italics) 
Cost 
2000 1,430 Draught proofing, Attic insulation. Dublin only €0.235m 
2001 1,500 Draught proofing, Attic insulation. Dublin only €0.207m 
2002 1,600 Draught proofing, Attic insulation. Dublin only €0.218m 
2003 1,768 Draught proofing, attic insulation 
Dublin, Limerick, Donegal, Cork and Kerry 
€0.584m 
2004 1,947 Draught proofing, Attic insulation,  
Cavity wall insulation, Hot water cylinder, 
Jackets, Low energy light-bulbs, Energy Advice. 
Dublin, Limerick, Donegal, Cork, Kerry and 
Wexford 
€0.598m 
2005 1,813 Draught proofing, Attic insulation, Cavity wall 
insulation, Hot water cylinder Jackets, Low 
energy light-bulbs, Energy Advice. 
Covering Dublin, Limerick, Donegal, Cork, 
Kerry, Wexford and Louth. 
€0.951m 
2006 2,102 Draught proofing, Attic insulation, Cavity wall 
insulation, Hot water cylinder Jackets, Low 
energy light-bulbs, Energy Advice. 
Covering Dublin, Limerick, Donegal, Cork, 
Kerry, Wexford, Louth, Galway, Mayo,  and 
Sligo 
€2.00m 
2007 3,378 Draught proofing, Attic insulation, Cavity wall 
insulation, Hot water cylinder Jackets, Low 
energy light-bulbs, Energy Advice. 
Covering Dublin, Limerick, Donegal, Cork, 
Kerry, Wexford, Louth, Galway, Mayo, Leitrim, 
and Sligo. 
High efficiency central heating and insulation in 
Waterford. 
€4.30m 
2008 2,124(to end 
of June 2008) 
Draught proofing, Attic insulation, Cavity wall 
insulation, Hot water cylinder Jackets, Low 
energy light-bulbs, Energy Advice. 
Covering Dublin, Limerick, Donegal, Cork, 
Kerry, Wexford, Louth, Galway, Mayo, Leitrim, 
Sligo, Roscommon, Clare and Cavan 
€1.84m* 
Total 17,662  €10.93m 
* estimated. 
Source: SEI 
 
As seen the Warmer Homes Scheme operates on a modest scale, at €4.3 million in 2007 
or €1,273 per dwelling. Two pilot extensions to the scheme have also been carried out. 
Homes numbering 200 in Dundalk received insulation measures and 388 homes in 
Waterford received extensive efficiency measures including boiler upgrades. We 
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understand that an evaluation of the Waterford initiative is in progress, which should 
provide important information to aid efficiency. 
The Housing Aid for Older People Scheme was introduced in November 2007 as an 
amalgamation of the previous Essential Repairs Grant scheme, as operated by local 
authorities, and the Special Housing Aid for the Elderly scheme, as operated by the Health 
Service Executive. We understand that an evaluation of the Housing Aid for Older People 
scheme is scheduled to take place at the end of 2008.  
Part-funded by this scheme, a pilot Central Heating Scheme has been run in association 
with Dublin City Council and Energy Action. Covering about 150 houses and aimed at 
houses occupied by older people, the scheme covers installation of central heating 
systems, associated insulation works, smoke alarms, energy advice and energy audits. A 
means test is used to determine eligibility.  
Scheme effectiveness 
Though many generally small schemes have been undertaken in Ireland, in practice it is 
hard to judge their effectiveness. In dealing with the fuel efficiency of dwellings and 
equipment, it is commonplace for institutions that are engaged in upgrades to count their 
output in terms of the numbers of upgrades installed. It is therefore noteworthy that 
Northern Ireland’s Home Energy Conservation Authority can point to an actual fuel 
consumption reduction of 20% within the housing stock over the ten-year period since 
1996. Ex ante preparation for, and ex post execution of, assessments of this type are 
important elements for guiding investment policies. 
The construction industry, previously unenthusiastic about retrofit activities, is now 
advocating a programme of home upgrades. There is also a suggestion from one country 
(Germany) that results-based compliance conditions could be investigated. This could 
ensure that public money is spent on measures that reduce the heating bill rather than, say, 
primarily raising the value of the housing asset, which may be a private asset. Sometimes 
even the collection of data on energy use before refurbishment has been overlooked, 
meaning that the benefits of lessons to be derived are lost. 
Efficiency of policy itself arises when one considers the issues of targeting. A policy is 
sub-optimal if it fails to tackle the most needy cases, particularly when those who are less 
in need are benefiting from schemes. The task of ascertaining need is never simple, but 
blanket coverage can raise costs and misdirect scarce resources, and subsidies once 
awarded are hard to withdraw. 
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5. Policies employed internationally 
In this section, we survey available information on policies addressing fuel poverty and 
affordability in other jurisdictions. We focus on Northern Ireland and the UK in general, 
and summary information on measures in several other countries is also presented. 
5.1 Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland provides an interesting case to study because of their strong engagement 
in the issue and pro-active policies. A high proportion, one in three households, in 
Northern Ireland is reckoned to suffer the effects of fuel poverty, which is the highest in 
the UK. This is the estimate given in Ending Fuel Poverty: A Strategy for Northern 
Ireland (Department of Social Development, 2004). Its definition of fuel poverty is 
having to spend more than 10% of income on fuel use “in order to maintain an acceptable 
level of temperature throughout the home".  
The number in fuel poverty is estimated by means of the Fuel Poverty Model of the 
Building Research Establishment (BRE). This model uses data from the House Condition 
Surveys, which gather information on the energy efficiency levels of households. This 
method of deriving numbers in fuel poverty is thus different again from the methods 
based on subjective measures and on pure expenditure shares. 
Subject to the availability of resources, Northern Ireland’s targets are: 
2010  Fuel poverty eliminated in vulnerable households and in the social rented sector.  
2016 Fuel poverty eliminated in non-vulnerable households.  
“Vulnerable” households are those that contain an elderly person, someone living with a 
disability or long-term illness, or a family with at least one child under 16 years of age. A 
partnership approach was identified as necessary owing to the severity of the problem, 
with an Inter-Departmental Group on Fuel Poverty and a Northern Ireland Fuel Poverty 
Advisory Group being set up. Fuel poverty by tenure is shown in Table 14 below. As in 
the Republic, owner-occupied homes are prominent, and the share of fuel poor households 
in Housing Executive homes is high. 
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Table 14: Extent of fuel poverty in Northern Ireland 
Tenure   
Number of house- 
holds in this tenure in 
fuel poverty 
Percentage of fuel poor 
households in this 
tenure 
Percentage of households in 
this  tenure that are 
fuel poor 
Owner-occupied   104,708 52% 24% 
Privately rented   23,291 11% 48% 
Housing Executive  70,484 35% 61% 
Housing Association  4,779 2% 27% 
  203,262 100%  
Source: Ending Fuel Poverty: A Strategy for Northern Ireland (DSDNI, 2004) 
It is logical, again, to divide our discussion of fuel poverty policies between income/price 
measures and home upgrades. 
Income and price measures 
The policy on fuel poverty in Northern Ireland aims to ensure that customers have the 
most suitable fuel and tariff and the most convenient method of paying and budgeting.  
The Winter Fuel Payments as in the UK until recently (see below) pays £200 to all 
people over 60 rising to £300 to those over 80, the cost of the scheme in Northern Ireland 
amounting to £50.2 million in 2006. 
Natural gas was selected as the fuel of choice for the social housing sector. Electricity 
customers in general pay an Energy Efficiency Levy, averaging £5 per customer. This 
Levy, amounting to £3.3 million in 2004, is used to support projects and initiatives, with a 
strong focus on fuel poverty and it is managed by Northern Ireland Electricity (NIE). 
This issue of requiring customers of a utility to cross-subsidise some of its other 
customers has been the subject of comment by Helm (2006). He points out that of the two 
major parts of the utility, the supply part and the distribution or grid part, using the supply 
part of the operation to raise funds to cross-subsidise the needy drives a wedge between 
price and costs. This is inevitably complex and distorting to what is supposed to be a 
competitive market. Trying to turn competitive suppliers into social and environmental 
providers into businesses that in effect are required to try to reduce their sales is likely to 
fail “for quite fundamental reasons”. Rather it is the monopoly element, the distribution 
grid, that is the natural agent for policy delivery of this nature. These grids are systems 
with regulated asset bases, and they are monopolies controlled in the public interest.  
Further, on the issue of income supports, the importance of ensuring that people do take 
up their entitlements is stressed in Northern Ireland’s strategy. Job seekers and benefit 
applicants and people seeking help or advice with fuel poverty issues are guided on what 
is available. The Energy Savings Trust Advice Centre advises on eligibility and savings 
but this is a problem that can be hard to tackle.   
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Home upgrades targeted on fuel poor 
The Northern Ireland Housing Executive has been designated Northern Ireland’s sole 
Home Energy Conservation Authority. Their remit covers all homes, whether privately or 
publically owned. It was required to develop a strategy to improve energy efficiency 
significantly and to submit annual reports. The 2006 House Condition Survey confirmed 
that a 20% improvement had been made in ten years, equivalent to annual savings of 3 
million tonnes of CO2, and Northern Ireland is ahead of the average figures for 
corresponding authorities in England. For this reason the work of the Housing Executive 
itself is of interest.  
Unfortunately figures in the Report for each authority that could provide significant 
guidance to policy, the total costs incurred by each authority, are absent. This would give 
insights into what interventions work and the relative returns from different types of 
approach and technology. 
The Executive is participating in an EU-funded study involving a number of housing 
associations in France and Germany.16  
According to the Housing Executive’s Annual Report 2007, their approach has been to: 
1. set up a full-time Energy Conservation Unit 
2. introduce a new heating and insulation policy for its own stock 
3. set up successful partnerships to deliver progress in the private sector. 
The Housing Executive’s following schemes are outlined. 
NI Schemes for the owner occupied sector 
Owners are encouraged to carry out energy efficiency works and where financial 
assistance is required there are grants and cash-back schemes, including: 
Housing Executive Grants 
Warm Homes Schemes. Managed by EAGA Partnership17 this targets low income 
households in the private sector. Those in receipt of qualifying benefits are eligible for 
grant aid. (28,100 homes had measures installed, and a further 2537 private rented homes 
had measures installed) 
                                                 
16 The project, under the SAVE Programme, aims to reduce energy consumption in the social housing sector 
at European level, providing tenants with information on their own consumption and in bringing 
personalized advice enabling them to appreciate the positive or negative influence of some of their actions. 
The approach suggested recognizes the great diversity of the living conditions and of culture in European 
social housing and does not try to define a single strategy. See: http://save.atwork4homes.eu . 
17 EAGA is the UK's leading provider of residential energy efficiency solutions and works in partnership 
with central and local Government, energy suppliers and social housing providers and is increasing its share 
of the able-to-pay private market. 
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Solar Water Heating programme for fuel poor households with technically suitable 
dwellings (500 dwellings). This scheme represents a sizable transfer to home owners and 
it would be useful to calculate the implied price per degree of warmth achieved, per tonne 
of CO2 saved and of other benefits. If one of the benefits is that the installations are test-
beds of physical research, the economic evaluations still do need to be undertaken. 
Schemes for NI Housing Executive stock 
 
A programme of converting heating away from coal and electric heating systems to 
natural gas, or oil where natural gas is not available, is in its eighth year. According to its 
Annual Report, the Executive made a re-appraisal of its heating policy, which is currently 
with the Department for Social Development.  
Practically all Housing Executive properties have full central heating and in 2006/7 the 
Executive started heating conversions to natural gas or oil in 4,550 of its dwellings. 
Insulation coverage is good (nearly total for lofts and 78% for wall insulation). Over half 
have full double glazing. A number of demonstration projects on new and innovative 
technologies have been undertaken by the Executive. These include solar water heating, 
solar photovoltaics, energy efficient window systems, micro-CHP, technologies for hard-
to-heat homes, and CLEVER homes. In addition, wood pellet boilers, heat pumps and 
wind systems have been installed on a small scale. In the Solar Water Heating Programme 
the Executive is installing solar water heating systems in 563 of its dwellings where the 
heating system was due for a change and the contractors are on site in any case. A scheme 
called Heatsmart targets certain Housing Executive tenants with advice on how to get the 
most out of their heating systems.  
Pay As You Go (PAYG) meters enable consumers to manage their energy consumption 
and there is a commitment to offer a discounted rate to customers on PAYG in Northern 
Ireland. A problem that has been identified is that households may disconnect when they 
are having difficulty in paying and no one might be aware of their situation. A pro-active 
approach is required on the part of the suppliers (CIPA, 2008). 
Other schemes are in place for the remaining dwelling types, namely, private rented stock, 
Housing Association stock, and multi-tenure stock. 
It is inevitable that with such a vast array of schemes there will be some that deliver very 
high benefits and others less so. There is a wealth of experience and, presumably, of data. 
It is not clear that the results of these schemes are being used to provide information on 
their net benefits or on the relative merits of the different modes. The full costs including 
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administration costs could be appraised in relation to the different aspects of the results 
(warmth, improvements in health, energy savings, emissions reductions, house values), 
and the different variants could be compared to help to prioritise policies in the face of 
budget constraints. The wide experience that there now exists provides an excellent 
source of data for ex post analyses. 
On this issue the comments of the NI Audit Office about the Warm Homes Scheme are to 
be noted. They are summarised in the Box below and indicate the need to focus more 
closely on objectives and undertake reviews of results achieved for the amounts spent on 
different schemes and delivery mechanisms. (Highlighting in bold has been added by the 
authors.) 
Some €2000 has been spent per home on average. Responses of the Executive to the 
Audit Office’s appraisal are not to hand but, in general, undertaking quite straightforward 
economic analysis of ‘case studies’ can direct policies to achieve better results for the 
money spent. The rich application here holds out the promise of being a valuable source 
material. 
A Task Force has been set up, charged with the issues of identification of vulnerable 
households, co-ordinating funds to give maximum effect and to engage the energy 
suppliers fully. 
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Extract from Northern Ireland Audit Office “Promoting accountability and best use of public money” [Emphasis 
added] 
                                   Warm Homes: Tackling Fuel Poverty                                    23 June 2008 
Report to the Northern Ireland Assembly by the Comptroller and Auditor General 
A report published today by John Dowdall CB, the Comptroller and Auditor General, examines the contribution 
made by the Department for Social Development’s Warm Home Scheme in delivering the Department’s 
objective of eliminating fuel poverty amongst vulnerable households by 2010. His report records that, since 
2001, the Department has spent £98 million to improve heating and insulation in 60,000 homes. 
 Mr Dowdall said “Warm Homes has significant potential to benefit the fuel poor. However it is clear that the 
Department’s strategic objective of eliminating fuel poverty cannot be achieved by this scheme alone. The 
Department needs to examine how the scheme can be more closely matched with its strategic objectives. It is 
also important that eligibility criteria for the scheme and the specific measures provided are reviewed to ensure 
the right measures are provided to those most in need.” 
Main Findings 
The scheme provides significant benefits for home energy efficiency. However, the scheme alone will have 
limited impact on fuel poverty which is determined by household income levels and fuel costs as well as energy 
efficiency.  
Although the Department has an overall aim to eliminate fuel poverty for vulnerable households by 2010, it has 
set no specific milestone targets for the owner-occupied and private rented sectors, the sectors at which the 
scheme is aimed. Operational targets for the Warm Homes Scheme are based solely on the number of 
households assisted. In addition, they provide no indication of the impact of the scheme on improving 
energy efficiency and reducing fuel poverty.  
The scheme’s marketing is effective and the use of specified passport benefits is a convenient way of 
determining eligibility for the scheme. However, significant numbers of fuel poor are excluded from 
assistance, including the working fuel poor who are not on benefits (estimated to be 28 per cent of the total fuel 
poor in 2004) and those who are eligible for benefits but do not claim them. For example, it is estimated that 
only half of eligible pensioners claim Pension Credit, a passport benefit for the scheme. The qualifying benefits 
which determine eligibility for the scheme include some non-means tested benefits. Some recipients of these 
benefits may not be in fuel poverty but will still be eligible for assistance through the scheme.  
The range of measures available provides flexibility to meet the needs of different households. However, the 
most effective measures are not available to all clients; central heating systems are only provided for those aged 
over 60. Homes receiving basic energy efficiency measures are unlikely to be lifted out of fuel poverty.  
Grants are not directed towards the least energy efficient homes. The Audit Office found that in 2006-07, 30 per 
cent were awarded to energy efficient households that were at little risk of fuel poverty. In addition, the scheme 
has not addressed the problem of ‘hard to treat’ homes, typically older, solid walled homes in rural areas.  
Costs of the energy efficiency measures have increased at a rate substantially higher than inflation and are higher 
than a similar scheme in England. Differences in cost between the two schemes are only partially explained by 
differences in technical specifications.  
Standards for quality and timeliness of installations have not been achieved. An independent assessment of 
heating installations in 2005-06 found that almost half did not meet the scheme’s quality standards. At March 
2008, 6,550 referrals for heating systems were awaiting installation, equivalent to a two-year backlog.  
The Department is currently reviewing the scheme as it prepares to let a new contract for its management and 
delivery. In May 2008, the Department also set up a Fuel Poverty Task Force to consider how fuel poverty can 
be addressed in the short term. The Task Force is due to report by the end of summer 2008. 
 
 
 
 
45
5.2 UK (England) 
“We are the first country in the world to recognise the issue of fuel poverty and to put in 
place measures to tackle the issue, including spending £20 billion on benefits and 
programmes since 2000.”18 
Fuel poverty was officially acknowledged as a distinct social problem in the UK 
following the election of a Labour Government in 1997 (EPEE, WP3 – D8). The 2000 
Warm Homes and Conservation Act required the Government to produce a strategy for 
eliminating fuel poverty in England and set targets for its implementation (the Act also 
covered Wales, while equivalent legislation was passed by the Scottish Assembly and 
Northern Ireland Assembly). The first UK Fuel Poverty Strategy was published in 
November 2001 and committed the Government to the ambitious goal of eliminating fuel 
poverty by 2015, with the initial focus on eradicating fuel poverty for ‘vulnerable’ houses 
by 2010. Vulnerable households are deemed to be those containing children, or people 
who are elderly, sick or disabled. There are small variations in the policies employed 
across the British Isles and, where specified, we focus on policy in England. A provisional 
objective for England was that by 2004, 800,000 vulnerable households would have been 
supported through home energy efficiency improvements, and the number of non-decent 
social sector properties reduced by one third (FPS, 2001). 
The 5th Annual Progress Report published in 2007 reports that, due to the combination of 
rising incomes, falling fuel prices and improved energy efficiency standards, the number 
of fuel poor households across the UK as a whole declined dramatically by 3 million 
between 1996 and 2005. However, the subsequent increases in fuel prices have made the 
Government targets look unrealistic (Baker, 2006). In part due to rising energy prices, 
2005 was the first year of in which the number of households in the UK in fuel poverty 
actually rose (Defra, 2007). 
The total number of households in fuel poverty in England in 2005 was 1.5 million 
(approx 7% of all households), and the number of vulnerable households was 1.2 million 
(Defra, 2007). This constituted a decline of 3.6 million and 2.8 million respectively from 
the corresponding figures for 1996. Focusing on the overall reductions in fuel poverty 
                                                 
18 Ministerial Foreword, THE UK FUEL POVERTY STRATEGY – 5th Annual Progress Report 2007. 
Meanwhile a broad coalition of organisations organisations (such as Age Concern, Barnardo’s, Child 
Poverty Action Group, Disability Alliance) has put out a Fuel Poverty Charter, which calls for a number of 
policies. These include: Delivering a renewed Fuel Poverty Strategy; Super energy efficiency and renewable 
energy; Raised incomes for fuel poor; and a Fairer energy market. 
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during this period, almost 75% was due to increased incomes; approximately 20% was 
due to energy efficiency measures; and the remainder was due to energy price reductions 
(Defra, 2007). 
The stated goal of the Government is “an end to the blight of fuel poverty for vulnerable 
households by 2010” (FPS, 2001: 3). The policies adopted in pursuit of this objective can 
be grouped under three headings: energy efficiency measures, energy market measures 
(liberalize energy markets and promote competition using new powers and duties 
introduced in the 2000 Utilities Act relevant to tackling fuel poverty) and social inclusion 
measures. “The Government’s approach to tackling fuel poverty in England is based on 
addressing the root causes: improving energy inefficient homes, reducing fuel bills and 
tackling low incomes and unemployment” (FPS, 2001: 39). 
A report carried out by the Centre for Sustainable Energy (Preston et al., 2008) considers 
the cost of meeting the targets in the UK. The report states that “currently £3.6 billion are 
spent nationally per year on key sustainable energy measures with an estimated £317m 
targeted at fuel poor and low income households” (Preston et al., 2008: xii). In order to 
reach the required targets, the paper finds that “an investment of £4.6bn would result in 
the application of energy-saving measures to 2.5 million (all current fuel poor) 
households, eliminating fuel poverty in 71% of fuel poor households and alleviating it 
significantly in the remaining 29%” (ibid: iii). However, relaxing the assumptions of 
perfect targeting and delivery based on the relevant criteria, the authors guess a doubling 
of this estimate to £9.2 billion. Table 15 below provides a summary distribution by energy 
efficiency rating of the number of fuel poor households and the associated percentages in 
1996 and 2001. The average energy efficiency rating is 51 and there have been strong 
improvements, though the 1.75 million households that are still below a rating of 51 is an 
indicator of the task that remains. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47
Table 15: UK Fuel Poverty by SAP (Standard Assessment Procedure) bands19 
SAP 
BANDS % of households in SAP band that are fuel poor 
 
Number of fuel poor households 
  1996 2001 1996 2001 
Under 30 52.50% 39.80% 1,714,000 747,000 
30 to 50 26.20% 13.70% 2,511,000 1,011,000 
Over 50 16.70% 5.30% 1,050,000 594,000 
All 26.80% 11.50% 5,275,000 2,352,000 
Source: http://www.nea.org.uk/fuel-poverty-and-energy-efficiency/  
 
The responsibility for achieving the targets set out in the 2001 Fuel Poverty Strategy is 
jointly held by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) 
and the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). However, the 
interrelated factors that affect the incidence of fuel poverty span a number of departments, 
such as the Department of Work and Pensions and the Department of Health. In addition, 
statutory obligations are imposed on suppliers and the gas and electricity regulator 
Ofgem. 
Income and price measures 
The Winter Fuel Payment scheme consists of a lump sum payment of between £250-
£400 during the winter months for people aged 60 or over. This represents a government 
payment of £2 billion per year (Defra, 2007). It is not targeted at the fuel poor. Currently 
the standard rate is £200, with those over 80 receiving up to an extra £100.In terms of 
scale, approximately 11.7 million people received payments in the 2006/07 winter. If 
counted against fuel bills, they are estimated to have removed a further one million 
households from fuel poverty in the UK (Defra, 2007). 
The Cold Weather Payment – in September 2008 the Government announced that the 
value of the Cold Weather Payment would be almost trebled, from £8.50 to £25. These 
payment are paid when the average temperature where the household is situated is 
recorded as, or is forecast to be, zero degrees Celsius or below, over seven consecutive 
days during the period from 1 November to 31 March. Specified Meteorological Office 
weather stations are used to obtain this information. Individuals on certain benefits are 
eligible. These include recipients of Income Support and Pension Credits. The total cost 
incurred by the Government in recent years has been around £3 million to £4 million. 
Eligibility for Cold Weather payments requires that the claimant be on the lowest safety 
                                                 
19  The Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) is an energy efficiency rating on a scale of 1 (worst) to 120 
(best) that measures the heating and insulation characteristics of a property.  
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net level of social security benefits and that there is an additional degree of vulnerability 
i.e. older inhabitants, very young children or some form of disability. 
Social Tariffs (or price discounts) are also employed in the UK. The 2000 Utility Act 
requires the energy industry regulator Ofgem to have ‘regard’ for the interests of old, 
disabled, low income and other vulnerable customers. Ofgem addresses this directive 
through the mechanism of a five year Social Action Plan. Ofgem monitors and publishes 
trends in company treatment of disadvantaged energy consumers through data contained 
in the Social Action Plan (EPEE, WP3-D8).  
“Social tariffs” include measures such as temporary price freezes and price caps, un-
metered tariffs, and prepayment meter tariff realignment (removal of surcharge). 
Prepayment meters are used primarily by low income customers, while the better-off 
customers favour payment by direct debit. Prepayment meter tariffs are generally higher 
than standard credit tariffs and always higher than direct debit tariffs. Most social tariffs 
in Britain are funded through the vehicle of CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Baker, 2006). In his 2006 paper, Baker found that all energy suppliers in the UK have 
now set up at least one social tariff, although their design varies considerably, e.g. by 
eligibility criteria, size of discount provided or longevity of discount. Details of the 
schemes on offer are given in Table 16 below. 
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Table 16: Details of current social tariffs used by UK energy suppliers 
Source: Baker, 2006 
 
The survey of energy suppliers found that targeting of consumers posed significant 
difficulty and required company resources to be diverted to the identification of the 
neediest individuals (Baker, 2006). In a report for Energywatch (2008) it is stated that the 
six major energy suppliers are currently committing an estimated £28.1 million, or 0.11% 
of estimated industry turnover, to social tariffs and bill rebates. If suppliers’ ceilings and 
commitments were fully achieved the amount could extend to over £60 million, or 0.25% 
of turnover. 
In evaluating energy company schemes and initiatives, Defra’s 5th Annual Progress 
Report quotes figures from the Energy Retail Association (ERA) indicating that from 
Supplier Social tariff Eligible groups Coverage 
British Gas £30 per fuel (£60 for duel fuel) 
paid in 2 stages as a credit on 
bills 
 
All BG consumers on means-
tested benefits living in deprived 
areas, identified by BG through 
Mosaic profiling. Consumers 
asked to confirm eligibility 
 
250,000 
EDF 
current 
 
Price freeze: worth, on average, 
£40 for duel fuel consumer 
 
All people living in fuel poor 
areas, as identified by EDF 
through small area fuel poverty 
model 
 
77,000 
 
EDF future  
 
15% discount   100,000 
Npower 
PSR credit 
 
£25 for electricity and £10 credit 
for gas (£35 for dual fuel) paid 
as credit on bills 
 
All people on PSR 20,000 
(estimate) 
Npower 
‘First step’ 
 
Transfer to cheapest tariff 
currently provided by Npower 
(currently dual fuel internet 
Direct Debit tariff) 
 
People in arrears or ‘struggling 
to pay their bills’ 
 
30,000 
 
Powergen 
ACES 
 
 
Price freeze: worth, on average, 
£40, plus cold weather payment, 
worth £20 (2004/05 value) 
 
Older people signing up to Age 
Concern Energy Services 
package 
 
180,000 
Powergen 
Staywarm 
 
Fixed price bill based on size of 
property and number of 
residents. 
 
All older people, providing 
current consumption is below 
certain level 
 
430,000 
 
Scottish Power £30 credit paid on bills All ppm users on PSR 5,000 
 
Scottish & 
Southern 
Energy 
Energycare 
plus 
 
Up to 20% discount Severe fuel poor households on 
benefits 
 
30,000 
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2002-2005, energy suppliers spent over £2 billion on addressing fuel poverty, including 
through their Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC, Priority Group measures, Defra, 
2007). For example, Npower announced a budget of £2.6 million as part of their 
Spreading Warmth programme (November 2007 to February 2008). The majority will go 
towards a rebate for 50,000 of their vulnerable customers, with the remainder to be used 
as a crisis fund for energy efficiency measures (Defra, 2007).  
In their “Social Action Strategy Update” of July 2008 Ofgem have analysed suppliers’ 
social initiatives, which they define to include social tariffs, rebates and partnership 
arrangements. Also included in the definition of social initiatives are energy efficiency 
measures, where suppliers can demonstrate that they are clearly additional to their 
statutory obligations under CERT (Carbon Emissions Reduction Target discussed later, 
i.e. the third phase of the third Energy Efficiency Commitment, for 2008-2011).  
Other measures focus on reducing the consumer detriment associated with debt and 
disconnection. Under the Fuel Direct scheme, the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) deducts an amount from claimants’ benefits to pay their fuel bills when 
disconnection has been threatened (Ofgem, 2005). The regulator Ofgem is involved in this 
process by liaising with energy companies over “best practice” with regards to 
disconnection.  
Energy Efficiency Measures and Home Upgrades 
The Warm Front grant, similar to the Warm Homes Scheme for Northern Ireland, is an 
energy efficiency programme for ‘vulnerable’ private sector households on means-tested 
benefits. It is a Government-funded initiative, managed by Eaga, which provides a 
package of insulation and heating improvements up to the value of £2,700 (or £4,000 if 
oil central heating is recommended). If the property has previously received Warm Front 
improvements, the funding now available will be the balance of the grant less the value of 
all works previously completed. The maximum grant level is not permanently fixed, but is 
regularly reviewed. The scheme’s annual report states that the size of the grant has 
increased by approximately 8% since 2002 (Warm Front Scheme Annual Report, 
2007/2008). 
In terms of eligibility, Warm Front grants are available to private homeowners and those 
who rent from a private landlord who are already on certain benefits such as income 
support, pension credits and disability living allowances. Eligibility may also depend on 
age and/or other household characteristics such as those with young dependents. 
 
 
 
51
Households that do not qualify for the grant may be entitled to a £300 energy rebate. This 
rebate is available to householders aged 60 or over who own their home or rent it from a 
private landlord, who either have no central heating system or one which is inoperable 
(http://www.warmfront.co.uk/index.htm). 
The Warm Front Scheme is a central component of the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy. 
According to the 5th Annual Progress Report, Warm Front has “continued to be a key tool 
in tackling fuel poverty in the private sector in England” (Defra, 2007: 14). Beginning in 
June 2000, the scheme has assisted 1.7 million homes in installing a variety of energy 
efficiency measures (Table 17 below). 
Table 17: Summary Data on the Warm Front scheme: assistance with energy efficiency measures 
 Assisted Households  
Measures 2007/200820 Scheme to Date21 
Cavity Wall Insulation  30,167 437,363 
Draught proofing  28,622 516,927 
Electric Central Heating 7,617 53,010 
Foam Insulated Domestic Hot Water Tank 542 7,752 
Gas Wall Heaters  383 23,709 
New Gas Central Heating 19,656 145,885 
Hot Water Tank Jackets 7,363 147,460 
Loft Insulation 58,580 596,016 
Boiler Replacements 74,093 217,267 
Heating Repairs 5,660 72,709 
Oil Central Heating 570 1,353 
Total 268,900 1,716,843 
Source: The Warm Front Scheme Annual Report 2007/08  
 
The total Warm Front budget for the period 2005-2008 was approximately £860 million 
(Defra, 2007); the announcement of an additional £74 million over the next two years 
means that the funding over 2008-2011 will total £874 million. The potential savings in 
annual energy running costs for a household receiving assistance in 2006/2007 was 
estimated at £186.74 (Warm Front Scheme Annual Report, 2007/2008).  
Despite the apparent success of the scheme, a number of potential problems can be 
identified. As discussed in the case of Northern Ireland, above, there are difficulties 
associated with “hard to treat” properties and “hard to reach” households. Households 
may be prevented from benefitting from the scheme due to a lack of awareness of its 
existence. The annual report comments that “increasing take-up among the most 
vulnerable customer groups depends on effective networks and partnerships with local 
                                                 
20 01/04/2007 - 31/03/2008 
21 01/06/2000 - 31/03/2008 
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and regional intermediaries, particularly in the voluntary sector, who help promote the 
Scheme to householders across England” (Warm Front Scheme Annual Report, 
2007/2008: 6). Furthermore, the size of the grant remains an issue since, as is pointed out 
in the evaluation of similar schemes in Ontario, Canada: “even if the programs are 
partially subsidized by the utility or government, the requirement for a capital outlay, of 
any size, presents a barrier to the low income consumer” (IndEco, 2003: 7).  
The Government has also put in place targets for the improvement of social housing. The 
Decent Homes Standard outlines the necessity for effective thermal insulation and 
efficient heating systems in homes. Fundamentally, it is a bare minimum below which 
homes should not fall in England. The Department of Communities and Local 
Government estimates that 95% of all social housing in England will meet this standard 
by 2010 (Defra, 2007). The 2005 English House Conditions Survey found that private 
sector homes are more likely to meet the required standards than social sector homes, but 
only by a small margin; 4.8 million private sector homes were found to be non-decent as 
compared to 1.2 million social sector homes, making up 27% and 29% of their stock 
respectively (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007).  
Under the 2000 Utilities Act, the government was granted the power to set energy 
efficiency targets on energy suppliers. The resultant Energy Efficiency Commitment 
(EEC) is an obligation on licensed gas and electricity suppliers to promote and/or assist 
domestic customers in improving household energy efficiency. It came into operation in 
Great Britain in April 2002. Under the EEC, suppliers are required to focus at least 50% 
of energy savings on low income customers in receipt of state benefits (Defra, 2007) and 
the energy suppliers can recover these costs as part of their charges to customers. The first 
phase – EEC1 (2002-2005) – was to deliver savings of 0.3 MtC a year in 2010 and 
generate about £600 million investment in energy efficiency. EEC2 (2005-2008) is 
expected to deliver savings of around 0.5 MtC a year in 2010 and generate about £1.2 
billion investment in energy efficiency (Defra, 2007). It is important to recognise that the 
EEC is principally a carbon abatement programme. This is made explicit in the re-naming 
of the third phase of the programme as the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT), 
which is due to run from 2008-2011. During this period, £2.8 billion will be allocated for 
energy efficiency work through CERT, £1.5 billion of which will be spent on the Priority 
Group – those in receipt of means tested or disability-related benefits and those aged 70 or 
over. 
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Other local measures and initiatives include fifty-two Energy Efficiency Advice Centres 
(EEACs) and organisations such as the Energy Saving Trust (EST) that manage a number 
of schemes to encourage the take up of energy efficiency measures by households. 
Community Energy Solutions (CES), with initial funding of £4 million plus private and 
public sector contributions, will assist a minimum of 4,000 households by 2009 through 
efficiency schemes. (Defra, 2007) Warm Zones Limited (WZL) is an area-based approach 
to the identification of fuel poverty and the co-ordinated delivery of energy efficiency 
improvements and related services to combat fuel poverty. Some funding is sourced from 
gas and electricity suppliers. Charities such as National Energy Action (NEA) are 
involved in campaigning for warmer homes. NEA has also instigated and developed a 
range of practical energy efficiency schemes, working in partnership with central and 
local government, and the private and voluntary sectors (FPS, 2001). Meanwhile, the 
Community Energy Efficiency Fund (CEEF) was launched in June 2007 with applicants 
invited to apply for support via a competitive process for the allocation of the £6.3 million 
funding available in England. The bidding process invited projects to identify a cost 
effective way of delivering EEC and Warm Front on a local basis. 
Recent Overview by the House of Commons  
In its report of July 2008, Energy prices, fuel poverty and Ofgem, the House of Commons 
Business and Enterprise Committee pointed out that 0.4 million households become fuel 
poor with every ten per cent increase in energy prices. The committee notes a proposal to 
exploit existing data of various involved bodies by sharing the data, stressing the need that 
it be handled with propriety. Better targeting is considered important e.g. of the Winter 
Fuel Payment specifically on the fuel poor amongst the elderly, and it  supports the Warm 
Front investment program that has a good track record of reducing energy bills by 30% 
(£300 per year). The desirability of a cross subsidy from other consumers to pay for the 
social tariffs offered by energy suppliers was questioned, not to mention the transparency 
and comparability of the tariffs (viz. Table 13 above). The task of amalgamating and 
comparing all benefits nationally is made more complicated. Though a currently small 
cross subsidy, the committee notes that it could become larger. The low share of the fuel 
poor that were receiving the social tariff is an issue and the committee felt that the set of 
criteria for identifying qualifying customers needs improvement. It considered that 
ultimately a fundamental rethink of how to tackle fuel poverty is required, pointing to a 
better focus on the application of the Carbon Emissions Reductions Target and the Warm 
Front with possible synergies between these two schemes. 
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Funding in the latest announcement September 2008 
The most recent reforms of 11 September incorporated above are the most ambitious yet. 
The lion’s share of new money arising is to come from energy companies and generators. 
They will contribute £910 million, comprised of £560 million for the existing Carbon 
Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) which funds subsidised improvements. The subsidy 
is generally 50 % of the costs but eleven million elderly or low income households will 
qualify for these at no cost. The remaining £350 million will go towards a new scheme 
which is a proposed new legal obligation on energy companies. Called the Community 
Energy Saving Programme, energy companies, local councils and voluntary 
organisations will carry out house-to-house calls to offer help in deprived areas of the UK. 
Combining all the government spending on efficiency programmes, including its £2 
billion spend on energy efficiency improvements in council homes under its Decent 
Homes programme, brings in a total efficiency spending over the next three years of £2.8 
billion. Combined with £3.7 billion required of the energy companies, the total national 
programme of energy efficiency investment over the next three years comes to £6.5 
billion. The aim is for all Britain’s homes to be insulated, where practicable, by 2020. 
Comment on UK schemes 
In assessing these schemes, the emphasis on the capital side, that is, on efficiency 
upgrades, is to be commended because these tend to show good returns when properly 
evaluated. The targeting of council homes and low income homes is also beneficial but 
application to all the elderly regardless of means is likely to incur needless cost on the part 
of taxpayers. That the funding required is to be provided in large part by energy 
companies has even less to commend it. Such distraction into social welfare activities and 
the determination of households’ socio-economic circumstances, where the companies do 
not readily have an advantage, is inappropriate. Requiring them to engage in what is 
ultimately ‘sales reduction’ is unrealistic. Recourse to cross-subsidisation by non-poor 
customers has little justification except to keep the expenditure off the government books. 
In this instance, however, the move reflects a desire to skim off some of the companies’ 
gains derived from free allocation of permits (as opposed to auctioned permits) in the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme.  
This is not to deny that energy companies are well placed to note instances of stress and 
hardship. They do have a vital role to play in such activities as notifying the welfare 
authorities about instances of claimed inability to pay. They can also respond to the need 
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for sensible payment methods and the like where households have difficulty in budgeting. 
Thirdly, they may be well-placed to act as a conduit, in so far as they are mailing or 
visiting homes, between the welfare authorities and households. 
5.3 Other Jurisdictions 
We are not aware of any research providing quantified descriptions of fuel poverty 
policies for a broad range of countries’ on a consistent basis. In this section we include 
results from three studies that contain some comparative international evidence. 
A recent study of experiences with financing social housing refurbishment22 investigated 
financing issues in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. This was part of a project 
that compared financing matters in these countries and in New Member States. The 
following paragraphs are not comprehensive descriptions but pick up on some individual 
features.  
Germany: The Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW) since 2001 supports the 
implementation of comprehensive refurbishment of buildings constructed before 1978 in 
what is called a CO2 Reduction Programme. The interesting aspect of this programme is 
that one of the compliance conditions is actually results-based. That is, one of the 
conditions is to prove a CO2 reduction of an annual 40 kg/m2 floor space. 
Denmark: Resources for construction and refurbishment in the social housing sector in 
Denmark are generated through the National Building Fund. The Fund’s revenues are 
generated by payments from the social housing co-operatives, independent institutions, 
local authorities and municipal authorities, and the Minister for Social Affairs can 
approve that the Fund obtain a government loan to cover the Fund’s expenses. Subsidies 
aimed at the housing sector mainly focus on reducing the consumption of energy for space 
heating. Some of the schemes aim to support the installation of more energy-efficient 
heating systems whereas others support investments in energy efficiency (SEI, 2003).  
The Netherlands: In the Netherlands a significant share (35%) of the housing stock is 
owned by social housing cooperatives providing housing to lower and to middle-income 
households. Housing is strictly regulated within a number of acts and decrees. Housing 
cooperatives generate their resources mainly by investments on the capital market, from 
rents and by selling part of the housing stock (which fetched a high price during the past 
decade) – evidently these sources are now facing constraints. Through the TELI 
                                                 
22 Donkelaar, 2007.WP2 overview report for the InoFin project, supported by the EC.  
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programme the government stimulates low-income households to implement energy 
saving measures, and provides information and advice. The TELI initiative has been 
evaluated in 2004 and a new roll-out has been issued in 2006. Under another scheme, the 
Green Funds Scheme, lenders invest in a bank fund at lower interest rates to fund ‘green 
projects’ (building and reconstruction with high energy performance) and in return the 
investors receive a tax deduction on their interest earnings.  
Table 18 below provides an outline of fuel poverty in selected European countries, 
drawing together information from two studies. 
 
Table 18: Summary of fuel poverty measures in selected jurisdictions 
Country 
Social 
Inclusion 
Measures via 
income support 
or tariffs Description 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Measures via 
insulation/equ
ipment 
upgrades  Description 
BELGIUM 
CPAS (Public 
Social Welfare 
Centres) in 
charge of social 
assistance 
/Social Fund for 
Energy 
Debt mediation, budgeting advice 
and some financial support for 
households having payment 
difficulties. Represents a 
preventative social policy 
intervention to preserve energy 
supply. 
MEBAR II - 
Walloon 
Region 
A grant of €1365 
maximum for energy 
efficiency 
improvements of 
housing given to low 
income households.  
  Heating Fuel Social Fund 
Subsidises heating costs for low 
income households. Was 
available between 01/09 and 
30/04 when prices reach or 
exceed €0.40 per litre of heating 
oil/propane (inc. taxes).The 
subsidy covers 1500 litres of 
heating oil or €195 per winter per 
household. The fund is made up 
of contributions deducted from 
the sale of all heating oil 
products. 
Flemish Region: 
Entitled to some free electricity 
per year - 100 kWh per household 
with an additional 100 kWh per 
member of the family. Cannot 
exceed yearly consumption. 
  
  Social Tariffs 
Preferential rates for electricity 
and gas regularly set by 
ministerial order. Beneficiaries of 
these specific social tariffs are 
called “protected customers”. 
Housing Code In each region 
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Country 
Social 
Inclusion 
Measures via 
income support 
or tariffs Description 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Measures via 
insulation/equ
ipment 
upgrades  Description 
CYPRUS     Efficiency Grant 
Since 2004 grants are 
provided to 
households for 
thermal insulation, 
solar thermal, 
geothermal heat 
pumps, PV. 
DENMARK Heating Costs 
There is a general housing benefit 
available and a system of cash 
benefits which may cover costs 
for heating. Assistance is given to 
pensioners for heating. 
 Support for 
exploiting 
solar energy, 
subsidy of 
50% to OAP 
for efficiency 
improvements 
 New Energy Savings 
Trust help for 
converting heating to 
district heat system. 
FRANCE 
Solidarity 
Energy Funds 
(FSE) 
Financial assistance for 
vulnerable households who are 
unable to pay their energy bills. 
Jointly funded by local and 
central Government, EDF-GDF, 
Assedic (National Unemployment 
Agency) and the voluntary sector. 
Annual budget approx. €46 
million. It is illegal to disconnect 
households receiving funds 
assistance from FSE or who have 
received assistance in the last 
twelve months during the winter 
period. 
Tax credit  
For the purchase of 
renewable energy 
equipment and 
energy saving 
materials. Deduct 
from Income Tax, 
capital cost only. 
Ranging from 15% to 
50% 
  
Social 
electricity tariff 
- French Health 
Agency (CAM) 
Households with annual income 
less than €5,520 (€460 per month) 
can receive a 30% reduction for 
an individual or a 50% reduction 
for a couple with two children or 
more for the first 100 kWh per 
month. 
ADEME - 
French 
Agency for 
Environment 
and Energy 
Management 
(public body) 
Home visits, 
provision of advice 
and information to 
individual 
households, 
undertaking energy 
audits 
  Minimum Supply 
In the case of unpaid electricity 
bills, access to supply must be 
maintained where the case has 
been referred to the FSE. A 
limited power supply will be 
maintained, providing for 
minimum electricity needs. EDF 
is committed to a no 
disconnection policy until contact 
has been established between the 
company and the customer.  
ANAH - 
National 
Housing 
Improvement 
Agency 
Subsidies to improve 
housing standards. 
20%-35% for owner-
occupiers with an 
upper limit of 
€13,000  
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Country 
Social 
Inclusion 
Measures via 
income support 
or tariffs Description 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Measures via 
insulation/equ
ipment 
upgrades  Description 
FINLAND Social Welfare 
Energy bills are one of the 
acceptable items in the last resort 
social assistance.  
Efficiency 
Grants 
For some groups of 
elderly people, there 
are special funds 
available for 
technical 
improvement of their 
houses, under Social 
Welfare. 
Repair and energy 
grants are aimed at 
reducing energy 
consumption and 
C02. Very strict 
building regulations 
GERMANY Social Welfare 
Households dependent on social 
welfare can receive costs for 
accommodation and heating from 
their social welfare office. 
Housing 
Standards 
Energy saving 
measures are 
obligatory in the 
construction of 
houses. 
GREECE Social Policy 
Households may not be 
disconnected from gas supply if 
their total debt remains below 
€90.00. 
    
  Discount Tariff 
A discount tariff is granted to 
families with three or more 
children. 
    
HUNGARY Subsidies 
Subsidies vary according to 
household income (4 eligible 
categories) and no. of occupants. 
Per unit subsidies in two income 
categories. Upper limits apply. 
Total expenditure 2007 was 110 
billion HUF, 82 billion HUF for 
2008. Measures are ensured to 
prevent disconnection in case of 
non-payment of bills. 
Household 
Energy Saving 
Credit 
Programme 
and National 
Energy Saving 
Programme 
2008 
  
ITALY 
Social Tariffs - 
National 
Authority for 
Energy (AEEG) 
Preferential charging for 
electricity consumption (fascia 
sociale). Current tariffs favour 
households with low energy 
consumption rather than low 
income. The National Energy 
Deliberation law in the gas sector 
allows each municipality to create 
a fund through a 1% levy 
(contributo sociale) on the 
distribution rate that is used to 
cover the costs for the poor and 
other vulnerable households. Only 
in 288 of 7,200 municipalities. 
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Country 
Social 
Inclusion 
Measures via 
income support 
or tariffs Description 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Measures via 
insulation/equ
ipment 
upgrades  Description 
LITHUANIA Social Welfare 
State support for low income 
families to ensure that no more 
than 20% of income is spent on 
central heating expenses.  
  
Renovation of old 
buildings to improve 
energy efficiency of 
housing.  
LUXEMBOURG 
Heating 
Allowance - 
’Allocation de 
chauffage’ 
Part of social security and 
housing benefit for low-income 
households. 
    
NETHERLANDS Debt and disconnection 
In principle consumers may not 
be disconnected during the winter 
period (from October to April). 
Energy companies should make 
efforts to get in personal contact 
with the consumer with debt 
problems.  
Energieprestati
eadvies (EPA) 
A Government 
scheme that gives 
advice on how to 
adapt dwellings in 
order to save energy.  
  Social Housing 
Social housing association 
WoonEnergie acts as a broker on 
the energy market and is able to 
offer its tenants cheaper energy. 
    
ROMANIA Winter Heating Allowance  
Minimum wage families receive 
monthly allowances during 1st 
November-31st March for house 
heating 
    
SLOVENIA 
National Policy 
Programme and 
Local 
Community 
Programme 
Special annual support for fuel for 
heating the home in winter 
months. The support payment is 
transferred directly to the energy 
provider. During winter months, 
low income households can apply 
for additional subsidies. 
    
SWEDEN Housing Allowances 
No specific energy allowances, 
but social insurance allowances 
are higher in Northern Sweden, 
where the climate is cooler 
Efficiency 
Grants 
The Swedish energy 
agency may give 
grants to individuals 
for installing bio-
energy, solar heating, 
and energy efficient 
windows. 
SPAIN 
Social 
Emergency 
Subsidies  
Given by the local authority to 
provide assistance to households 
in debt with their energy bills or 
who have poor housing 
conditions. 
    
    
Spanish Government has a 
programme to tackle excess 
summer mortality to address 
unaffordable cooling costs but not 
excess winter mortality. 
Building 
Regulations 
Stricter national 
legislation on 
building was 
introduced in 2006 
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Country 
Social 
Inclusion 
Measures via 
income support 
or tariffs Description 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Measures via 
insulation/equ
ipment 
upgrades  Description 
UK  
(since Sept 2008) 
Winter fuel 
payments 
Payable each winter to most 
people aged 60 or over. 
Households with someone aged 
60-79 receive £250 and 
households with someone aged 80 
or over receive £400. 
(N.B., this is not targeted at the 
fuel poor per se.) 
Warm Front 
Scheme 
(previously 
Home Energy 
Efficiency 
Scheme) for 
home owners 
or private 
rented. 
The Warm Front 
Grant provides a 
package of insulation 
and heating 
improvements up to 
the value of £2,700 
(or £4,000 if oil 
central heating is 
recommended), 
subject to eligibility 
criteria. 
  Cold weather payments 
Paid to vulnerable households 
who are on certain benefits in 
periods of very cold weather in 
their area. A payment of £25 is 
made automatically for each week 
of very cold weather - the average 
temperature must be recorded as 
0° C or below for seven days in a 
row. 
Decent homes 
programme 
 
Aims to bring social 
housing standards up 
to a decent standard 
by 2010 
  Social Tariffs 
‘Voluntary’ agreement with the 
UK’s six largest energy suppliers 
to benefit 0.6 m customers from 
their social support programmes. 
A variety of measures offered by 
different suppliers – include 
temporary price freezes and price 
caps, un-metered tariffs and ppm 
tariff realignment (removal of 
surcharge). Often funded through 
cross-subsidization 
Carbon 
Emissions 
Reduction 
Target (CERT) 
set for energy 
supply 
companies  
(previously 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Commitment - 
EEC) 
The promotion of 
improvements in 
domestic energy 
efficiency by 
electricity and gas 
suppliers. at least 
50% of energy 
savings must be 
focused on a priority 
group of low-income 
consumers  
   
New scheme: 
Community 
Energy Saving 
Scheme 
Funded by energy 
suppliers and, now, 
generators, will carry 
out house-to-house 
calls to offer help 
with saving energy in 
deprived areas. 
Sources: EPEE, WP3 – D8 and Morgan, E., Energy poverty in the EU, 
http://www.cecodhas.org/images/stories/newsflash/news2008/energypovertymorgenl.pdf. 
 
Discussion 
The majority of assistance described for all the jurisdictions covered in Table 18 is funded 
by government or local authorities, though there are three instances here of cross-
subsidisation by other energy customers. Cross-subsidisation occurs in the oil market in 
Belgium, in the gas industry in Italy, electricity in France, and in the large energy 
suppliers and now the generators in the UK. We should note that in Ireland there is a form 
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of cross-subsidisation in place albeit for a different purpose, which operates through a 
levy called the Public Service Obligation (PSO). Customers pay the levy on their bills and 
the proceeds are used ultimately to support regional socio-economic aims. 
All countries appear to give some current payments, except Cyprus and Sweden 
apparently. In the latter case, North Sweden has higher benefits, reflecting the harsher 
climate. Five instances of grants for efficiency upgrades are noted, for Belgium, Cyprus, 
France, Sweden and the UK. By contrast, Finland, Germany and Spain appear to have 
concentrated more on the introduction of strict energy efficiency standards.  
The Commission aims to persuade member states to grant less state aid and they consider 
that subsidies to consumers of an industry’s output can be classified as a state aid. In its 
new community guidelines for state aid for environmental protection the Commission 
allows member states within limits to continue to encourage state aid for renewable 
energy and energy efficiency (OJ, 2008). In general, prices set below market prices 
through regulatory and political intervention are viewed as a barrier to retail competition 
with the effect of keeping the recipient customers from moving into the competitive 
market. The Commission points out that such tariffs should not be necessary in any case 
as all EU member states now have social welfare systems that should be able to deal with 
such social issues. This is a view shared by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008).
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6. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we have provided updated estimates for the scale of fuel poverty in the 
Republic of Ireland using two measures, presented modelling results as to the 
characteristics of households most vulnerable to it, examined the potential effects of 
future fuel price changes, and discussed policy responses in Ireland and selected foreign 
jurisdictions. 
Scale and socio-economic pattern of fuel poverty in Ireland 
Estimates based on the most recent data (for 2005) indicate that almost 16% or 229,000 
households were vulnerable to fuel poverty in Ireland, on the basis that they paid more 
than 10% of income after housing costs towards home heating and electricity.  
A subjective measure, which is based on households that say that they cannot afford to 
heat their homes adequately and/or had to go without heating in the last 12 months due to 
lack of money, gives consistently lower figures; the latest estimate is 8.1% or 119,000 
households in 2006.  
We found strong evidence for a positive association between fuel poverty and being a 
tenant or where the main economic supporter of the household is a widow/widower, 
divorced/separated, female, not ‘employed’ or has low educational qualifications. Other 
household characteristics showed significant relationships to fuel poverty in one or other 
of the models, but not both. 
A crude extrapolation of the expenditure-based figure to 2008, during a period in which 
average fuel prices rose faster than average incomes, would suggest that the fuel poverty 
rate is now over 19%, or 300,000 households. 
The number of affected households is likely to rise significantly if there are further 
increases in energy prices without corresponding improvements in household energy 
efficiency. Of course, falls in energy prices would serve to reduce the number of affected 
households.  The fuel poverty rate is particularly sensitive to changes in electricity prices. 
Fuel poverty is sustained by a lack of capital investment as well as current resources. The 
data show that fuel poor households are more likely to use solid fuels and low efficiency 
space heating appliances, e.g. open fires, solid fuel heaters/cookers and back boilers, than 
other households. We show that coal is regarded as an inferior good, while gas and 
electricity have positive income elasticities (although demand is inelastic for all income 
deciles). It seems that affected households would like to switch to cleaner fuels and 
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heating systems, but are prevented from doing so by a combination of limited resources 
(incl. access to capital) and market failures.  
Fuel poverty’s three drivers (fuel price, low incomes, and fuel efficiency of dwellings and 
equipment) all have a role to play in the policy solution. Below we discuss each of these 
components, as well as outlining some further policy options concerning the availability 
of information for research and policy monitoring. 
Policy – fuel prices 
The cost of fuel to the household can be presented in a transparent and budget-friendly 
way, but further measures such as subsidies to reduce the price level per se are not 
recommended. Subsidies should generally operate through income supports.23  
Policy – current supports 
A substantial sum, over €350 million, is spent annually on income-support and subsidy 
measures, while investment in efficiency is but a fraction of this amount. For example, the 
Warmer Homes Scheme has a budget of only €5 million for 2009. Attempting to address 
fuel poverty mainly by means of income and price support policies is costly and wasteful 
– it tackles the symptoms rather than the problem – especially as the benefits of 
investment in efficiency upgrades are now even higher than indicated by the studies 
undertaken nearly a decade ago. 
Nevertheless, while fuel poverty persists there is still a role for current supports at the 
margins. Among vulnerable groups, the case for maintaining people in their own homes 
or ensuring comfortable conditions for young and school-going children, for example, 
will continue to require focused intervention. Education supports on fuel use and home 
efficiency can also play a role. 
To the extent that income supports are used, they need to have the flexibility to respond to 
the Consumer Price Index (Fuel and Light) in a timely manner. This need for 
responsiveness is underlined by the scale of recent fluctuations in energy prices. 
Moreover, future policy measures with significant implications for energy prices, such as 
carbon taxes, will need to be accompanied by changes in other taxes and benefits to 
prevent adverse effects on fuel poverty rates. 
                                                 
23 The European Commission and the International Energy Agency are also interested to see such aids 
delivered through standard welfare procedures.  
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Policy – Efficiency 
Low-income and vulnerable households face difficulties in meeting the current costs of 
heating homes at least partly because their costs are aggravated by energy inefficient 
dwellings and equipment. Past research has suggested many reasons for this; for example, 
tenants generally lack the right incentives to invest in household energy efficiency, low 
income households may have limited access to credit and there are imperfections in the 
supply and use of information about potential efficiency opportunities. Some vulnerable 
people may also discount future benefits heavily, worry about uncertainty about payoffs 
or have a limited appetite for the sort of disruption and time commitment associated with 
making efficiency-enhancing investments.  
Past policy has recognised that investment in social housing efficiency is important, but 
our empirical results also indicate a significant problem of fuel poverty among those in 
privately rented properties. This area should receive further attention, because the market 
failures affecting investment by tenants are likely to be persistent unless new ways are 
found to address them. 
For other vulnerable households, the constraints that limit investment in efficiency 
probably have more to do with limited total resources, access to credit or information. The 
presence of such market failures justifies intervention by government. 
In the context of economic efficiency, the net benefits to society of tackling fuel poverty 
(in terms of improvements in health and comfort and reduced energy consumption and 
environmental emissions) are very substantial, as shown for example by Clinch and 
Healy, 2001, and point to the net benefits of domestic energy-efficiency programmes. 
Thus a shift to funding capital improvements, alongside reduced emphasis on fuel price 
subsidies and expenditure supports, is indicated. 
Incomplete assessments of past projects have given rise to questions about their cost 
effectiveness: do the schemes represent the best way to have spent some of the money 
incurred on upgrades? The job of targeting assistance at homes in most need and where 
the potential energy savings is greatest could benefit greatly from an analysis of the rich 
data that should have been generated by the many schemes in operation and from future 
audits.  
Policy – Information for research and policy monitoring 
Estimates of the number and distribution of households in fuel poverty could be made 
more accurate if regular surveys of house conditions were available. The Building Energy 
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Rating and audit data will provide some help in the long term. It is a moot point, however, 
as to whether this is superior to ‘subjective measures’ that reflect the feelings of 
inhabitants themselves. 
The anonymised HBS microdata file on which much of our analysis is based was released 
by the CSO in April 2008, and unfortunately this survey is repeated only every five to 
seven years. If this schedule is maintained, no one will have the data to update this 
analysis until about 2013, using data collected in 2010. To obtain more frequent updates 
(e.g. for monitoring the effects of policy measures), more frequent scheduling of HBS 
waves would be helpful. 
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